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et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

January 29, 2019

The Honorable Betsy DeVos
Secretary of Education
Care/Of Brittany Bull
United States Department of Education
400 Maryland Avenue, SW
Room 6E310
Washington, District of Columbia 20202
Re: Docket ID ED-2018-OCR-0064
Dear Secretary DeVos:
On behalf of the State University of New York, I write to offer comments in opposition
to the above-referenced Proposed Regulations under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 I ask that each comment herein be
carefully considered and responded to before Final Regulations are issued.
As a general matter, the State University of New York believes that the vast majority of
the Proposed Regulations exceed the Department’s authority and include requirements that are
contrary to the evidence, are inconsistent with other federal and New York State law, and
represent a marked change in approach from the position of the Department during prior
Democratic and Republican administrations. The State University of New York therefore is
strongly opposed to these Proposed Regulations and asks the Department to withdraw them from
consideration.
The State University of New York (SUNY) is the largest comprehensive system of higher
education in the United States, with 64 college and university campuses located within 30 miles
of every home, school, and business in the state. As of Fall 2018, nearly 425,000 students were
enrolled in a degree program at a SUNY campus. In total, SUNY served 1.4 million students in
credit-bearing courses and programs, continuing education, and community outreach programs in
the 2017-18 academic year. SUNY oversees nearly a quarter of academic research in New York.
Its students and faculty make significant contributions to research and discovery, contributing to
a $1.6 billion research portfolio. There are 3 million SUNY alumni worldwide, and one in three
New Yorkers with a college degree is a SUNY alum.
SUNY has invested significantly in the prevention of, and response to, sexual and
interpersonal violence on campus and in the community. University leadership and staff have
1

5 U.S.C.A. § 706.
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traveled to the White House, testified before the United States Senate, and advised executive and
legislative leadership and staff at both the federal and state levels, as they consider legislation
governing institutional response to harassment and violence both domestically and while on
study abroad. In 2014, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo met with the SUNY Board of
Trustees to discuss the issue of sexual assault on campus. The resulting Working Group 2 and
uniform policies 3 were widely lauded as the most comprehensive, forward-thinking, and
balanced in the nation, and formed the basis for legislation introduced by the Governor. That
legislation, Education Law Article 129-B (referred to as “Enough is Enough”), was passed by
wide bipartisan majorities. It passed unanimously in the State Senate, with a Republican
majority, and with all but four votes in favor in the State Assembly. SUNY proudly worked with
New York State’s Education Department and other stakeholders to develop regulations
implementing pieces of the legislation, 4 as well as a guidance document to assist campuses in
implementing the law, 5 and partnered with the New York State Department of Health and State
Coalitions to develop a model Memorandum of Understanding for campuses and external
programs. 6 SUNY obtained a federal grant to translate important policies under the law into 120
written languages and American Sign Language, and made those translations freely available for
download. 7
On the national level, we regularly work with Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand and New
York delegation Members of the House of Representatives from both parties to assist them in
considering and drafting legislation in this area. SUNY was the first University to endorse the
Campus Accountability and Safety Act, bi-partisan legislation introduced in each House of
Congress.
After passage of the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the Clery Act, SUNY
developed a free 93-page resource 8 to assist colleges and universities in compliance. Issued
within weeks of the Regulations, it was downloaded tens of thousands of times before the
Department issued an updated Clery Act Handbook. The new law called for, among other things,
access to existing “visa and immigration resources.” In response, SUNY brought in partners and
developed a Visa and Immigration Resource to assist campuses in providing plain-language
information. That resource has likewise been translated into 120 written languages and made

2

https://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-workgroup/.
https://system.suny.edu/media/suny/content-assets/documents/sexualviolenceprevention/SUNY-Policies-SexualViolence-Prevention-Response-Updated-Jun2015.pdf.
4
Part 48 Annual Aggregate Data Reporting by New York State Institutions of Higher Education Related to Reports
of Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Stalking and Sexual Assault, NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
(Aug. 31, 2017), available at https://www.regents.nysed.gov/common/regents/files/917brca4.pdf.
5
Complying with Education Law Article 129-B, NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (June 2, 2016),
available at http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/article-129-b-guidance.pdf.
6
https://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-workgroup/mou-model/.
7
SUNY SAVR 129-B Translations, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Funded in part with a grant through the New
York State Department of Health. https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScEre2v0QmQxEy_GFhvSIcdqBQwbdme_xvKUIptvkTtF8Y0g/viewform?c=0&w=1.
8
Policy and Programming Changes Pursuant to the Campus SaVE Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act,
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (JULY 2014 AND JAN. 2015), HTTPS://SYSTEM.SUNY.EDU/MEDIA/SUNY/CONTENTASSETS/DOCUMENTS/GENERALCOUNSEL/SUNY-VAWA-GUIDANCE-2014.PDF.
3
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available for download and customization at no cost. 9 SUNY partnered with the City University
of New York (CUNY) to develop SPARC, 10 an online introduction to prevention training that is
likewise made available for download and customization by colleges and universities at no
cost. 11 SUNY partnered with the One Love Foundation 12 to develop the largest installation of a
dating violence prevention program in the nation, directly reaching over 20,000 students in a one
month awareness program and reaching thousands more via social media. 13 SUNY collaborates
with the New York State Office of Victim Services and many partners on SUNY’s Got Your
Back, a program to educate college students in violence reduction while assembling comfort bags
for those who present to hospitals, rape crisis programs, domestic violence shelters, and law
enforcement. To date, tens of thousands of bags have been assembled while educating thousands
of students and community members. 14
While we appreciate the time and effort the Department has expended in researching and
proposing a series of regulations on this critically important issue, aside from certain minor
technical areas, the State University of New York must respectfully oppose the implementation
of these Proposed Regulations in their current form.
In Part I of SUNY’s comments, we address the Secretary’s authority to regulate Title IX,
which falls under 20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq., in the introductory regulatory language of proposed 34
CFR Part 106 et seq. In offering comments regarding this authority under 20 U.S.C. 1681, et
seq., we highlight areas of alignment, while raising major concerns about the significant
economic, legal and regulatory problems evinced within the Proposed Regulations, to provide
the Department with sound guidance about the appropriate path forward. Then, in Part II, we
proceed to comment on each section of the Proposed Regulations in the order they are proposed.
We identify specific areas within the Proposed Regulations that must be reconsidered or
removed to comply with the text and purpose of Title IX. Preceding our formal comments, we
begin with an Executive Summary.

9

Immigration and Visa Information In Response To Sexual & Interpersonal Violence, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK, Funded in part with a grant through the New York State Department of Health.
https://www.suny.edu/violence-response/Visa-and-Immigration-Resource/.
10
Sexual and interpersonal violence Prevention And Response Course.
11
SPARC: Sexual and Interpersonal Violence Prevention & Response Course Online Training, STATE UNIVERSITY
OF NEW YORK AND CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Funded in part with a grant through the New York State
Department of Health. https://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-workgroup/online-training/.
12
https://www.joinonelove.org/.
13
https://www.suny.edu/y4y/.
14
https://www.suny.edu/gotyourback/.
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Executive Summary
The Department of Education’s (the Department) Proposed Regulations pursuant to Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 include minor technical areas with which the
University agrees. However, the vast majority of the Proposed Regulations exceed the
Department’s authority and include requirements that are contrary to the evidence, inconsistent
with other federal and New York State law, and represent a marked change in approach from the
position of the Department during prior administrations (both Democratic and Republican). The
State University of New York (SUNY), therefore, after much consideration, must oppose these
Proposed Regulations and ask the Department to withdraw them from consideration.
SUNY does not believe the Department has made a sufficient showing that it has the
authority to propose important aspects of these regulations under Title IX itself. The Department
has not offered any evidence that there has been any disparate impact on Respondents in the
conduct process, the party of interest for the Department in proposing these new rules, and has
not shown that there is discrimination to be redressed on the basis of sex. The Department clearly
has the right to regulate under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 in a way that
addresses unequal treatment on the basis of sex. But there must be some evidence that the
regulation is promulgated to address inequality or discrimination on the basis of sex.
Undoubtedly, through its request for comments, the Department has received references to
dozens of studies of populations in college, secondary education, and society-wide showing a
clear and statistically significant difference in the percentage of males versus females who are
subject to sexual harassment, sexual violence and unequal treatment on the basis of sex.
Approximately 1 in 5 females report in climate surveys that they have experienced nonconsensual sex in their college years, while 1 in 13 males report the same, with transgender
students generally reporting even higher rates. Simply analyzing identified male and female
experiences with harassment shows that it has a differential impact on the basis of gender.
Therefore, the Department would be on fairly solid ground requiring educational institutions to
offer resources aimed at ameliorating the impact of such discrimination for which prevalence
differs so much by gender, and requiring institutions to take it seriously and pursue
investigations and adjudications to sanction those who violate the law and policy. That would be
tied to serious, published and peer-reviewed studies that consistently show a differential impact
in victimization and impact between genders.
Conversely, the Department presents no such published study showing that a complete
lack of due process, traditional due process owed under case law, or the new maximized due
process envisioned in these Proposed Regulations differently impacts people on the basis of sex.
After careful research, we can find no such study. The Department has not shown or referenced
any evidence that due process differences affect people differently on the basis of sex. Plainly,
the Department now offers a mistaken understanding of its own regulatory system surrounding
Title IX. Its Proposed Regulations distort the beneficial impact that Title IX has had on
protecting Reporting Individuals and ensuring a fair process for all parties in campus disciplinary
proceedings. The detailed due process provisions of the Proposed Regulations may or may not be
a good idea. But the Department does not have jurisdiction to mandate “good ideas” or “best
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practices.” It is not a consulting firm. The Department only maintains jurisdiction under this
Civil Rights law to regulate in a way that reduces discrimination on the basis of sex.
Even conceding for the sake of argument that a Respondent, if treated differently than
similarly situated individuals of another sex, could be a victim of discrimination on the basis of
sex, the Department still must show that the current system is actually allowing discrimination
on the basis of sex. The Department has not shown that Respondents are predominantly male. It
may assume so based on the few conversations it held with activists in preparation for drafting
these Proposed Regulations, but there is no actual evidence this is so. Further, even if most
Respondents were male, there is no evidence that they are held responsible more or less often
than females, that their sanctions are greater or lesser than females, or that these additional due
process requirements would change that. The Department must regulate within its jurisdiction.
There is no evidence here that the current system of investigating and adjudicating sexual
harassment and violence leads to disparate treatment on the basis of sex. There is no evidence
that these Proposed Regulations would lessen such disparate impact. The Department simply
does not have jurisdiction to regulate in this way and cannot do so without some evidence that
this is not a solution in search of a problem but an evidence-based method of addressing a
problem of unequal treatment on the basis of sex.
SUNY also must oppose these Proposed Regulations because they fail the standards of
the President’s Executive Order 13771. The cost savings the Department proposes are inaccurate
and exaggerated, and the Department should have to identify two deregulatory actions for every
new regulation in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. There is no actual cost savings here;
instead, it is a cost shift that is a result of fewer cases being investigated under Title IX but still
being investigated and adjudicated under the Clery Act and state law. The due process
obligations will increase actual costs within Title IX investigations and will lead to significant
additional litigation. Further, the proposals will drive up costs for both the institutions and their
students.
SUNY also does not believe the Department has followed the Administrative Procedure
Act, and thus its actions will not withstand judicial scrutiny. Only a few days ago, a lawsuit
against the Secretary of Commerce overruled his bid for a 2020 census question because the
courts ruled that the Secretary had clear pretexts for his actions and ignored public opinion, facts
and evidence. As the January 2019 decision in State of New York v. Department of Commerce
shows, courts will look beyond the “presumption of regularity” afforded Executive Branch
officials where they cannot escape the conclusion that the agency’s stated rationale was not the
true reason for its actions, and may look both within the administrative record and outside of it to
identify if the stated reason for acting was just a pretext masking an unstated goal. Over 50,000
comments have been submitted so far to the Department, and the overwhelming majority are in
opposition to this regulatory action the Department seeks to take. From its own statements since
coming into office, Department leadership decided what they wanted the regulations to cover,
and then built a document to suit.
In addition, while the regulations state that the Department considered First Amendment
Constitutional freedoms, the Department impinges on an institution’s academic freedom, which
is protected under the First Amendment. SUNY is unable to find any case that says the First
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Amendment or other Constitutional rights automatically give way just because the action by the
federal government is declared to be under the Spending Clause. The due process elements of the
Proposed Regulations abrogate the rights of colleges to determine their process at a local level, in
a shared governance approach with the communities they serve, by setting detailed and
comprehensive processes before the institution can determine whether someone credibly accused
of harassing or assaulting another member of the institution’s community can be sanctioned or
limited in their ability to continue harassing or assaulting the Reporting Individual or other
community members. It is clear that these Proposed Regulations rescind the common principles
of local control, and micro-regulate a process that many institutions have put significant research
and resources into creating.
SUNY also believes that the Department’s Proposed Regulations significantly abridge
Federalism principles enshrined within the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. New York
will acutely feel this impact as it has the nation’s most comprehensive state law to combat sexual
assault, dating violence, domestic violence and stalking within college communities. New York
also has detailed laws to combat sexual harassment in the workplace, and the Department’s
Proposed Regulations interfere with many laws a state is charged with implementing under the
State’s police powers. As the Department alluded to in its Directed Questions, there is a
significant impact on New York’s labor sector regarding these requirements in the Proposed
Regulations. The Proposed Regulations themselves conflict with New York City labor laws,
New York State labor laws, and cause significant issues with collective bargaining agreements.
SUNY also has specific issues with multiple sections of the Proposed Regulations. By
pulling in the Clery Act definition of “sexual assault,” the Regulations would create process
conflicts depending on the type of report. Essentially, the Department is creating a different
process for sexual harassment including sexual assault that is not consistent with existing statute
and regulations covering that same assault. Institutions will have to choose between violating the
Clery Act, and risking fines and funding, or violating the new Title IX regulations and risking
funding and having their determinations overturned (but only in favor of Respondents). It is also
clear that the notice provisions are far more onerous than what is provided to someone under the
Clery Act or even someone questioned by police. Campus conduct processes have never been
treated as a stand in for criminal adjudications, and that has not changed.
SUNY also has specific issues with the way the Department structured proposed section
106.44, regarding an institution’s response to sexual harassment under Title IX. Previously, the
geography to which campus conduct processes applied did not just include incidents within the
United States. By narrowing the geography of where institutions’ codes of conduct apply, it
essentially excludes recourse for students on study abroad programs sanctioned by institutions
and creates significant issues with campus management and supervision of Greek letter
organizations. The Department’s treatment of geography within these Proposed Regulations is
also in direct conflict with the Congressional intent of the 2013 Violence Against Women Act
amendments to the Clery Act.
SUNY also takes issue with the Department’s partial “safe harbor” because it is written in
such a way that would significantly elevate the Respondent’s rights over the Reporting
Individual when due process balancing dictates that each are to be treated equally in a conduct
Page 6 of 82
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/44
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1838

6

et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

process. SUNY also raises concerns with the unintended consequences of the mandated
investigation of an Accused when there are two or more complainants due to the damage it will
do to the rights of Reporting Individuals and Respondents. The Department includes higher
disclosure requirements that would force an institution to reveal the names of all those who had
made a complaint to date even if those who disclosed the incidents do not wish to participate in
the process. SUNY also objects to the “emergency removal” provision the Department has
provided for in these proposed regulations. Again, there is a lack of clarity on procedure that can
be interpreted to modify current college and university procedure.
SUNY also finds that many areas in proposed section 106.45, which addresses the
process for formal grievance procedures for sexual harassment, lack clarity and engage in cost
shifting on institutions and students. The Department did not define “bias” in one area, which
could lead to significant legal challenges on frivolous bases and extend the time before formal
hearings are completed. SUNY also found that there is no definition of “delay solely caused by
administrative needs,” which could lead to needless challenges. SUNY can think of multiple
situations in which something may have to be postponed for minimal time, and if these Proposed
Regulations go into effect, this could cause confusion and challenges. The Department also puts
bounds around which standard of evidence may be used (preponderance of the evidence versus
clear and convincing evidence), where other authority, such as the Clery Act, are neutral on such
choice. The Department also regulates K-12 institutions and institutions of higher education
differently to a point that ignores the balance of due process required for each type of institution
and ignores the level of quasi-property rights afforded to each student at each different level.
SUNY has found that the way the Proposed Regulations treat cross-examination and
“advisor of choice” are structurally defective and completely obliterate any cost savings the
Department believes it will find by implementing these provisions. Contrary to what the
Department stated only a few years ago, it now seeks to add significantly to the Clery Act
“advisor of choice” language by essentially requiring equal representation in all forms in all
campus conduct proceedings, which would include attorneys, and mandate cross-examination.
The cross-examination mandate would harm both Reporting Individuals and Respondents
because if they do not participate, all their previous testimony and submissions will be excluded.
While the impact on Reporting Individuals is obvious, the Department likely did not realize the
harm to Respondents who may face analogous criminal charges and are advised not to participate
in cross-examination.
SUNY also finds that allowing access to evidence on which the institution does not
intend to rely will cause significant privacy and confidentiality issues if not defined further. The
Department’s timeline for an official investigative report is also practically unworkable because
institutions and students expect that the conduct process will be resolved in a timely and
expedient manner. This requirement would cause an onerous burden on institutions, Reporting
Individuals and Respondents alike, and would cause undue delay in resolving conduct issues
while adding little to Title IX’s core legislative mission of reducing sex-based barriers to
educational access. SUNY also urges the Department to revisit its language regarding appeals, as
it causes undue confusion and changes the nature of what may be appealed for against common
practice across the country.
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SUNY and its campuses care deeply about preventing and responding to harassment and
assault in a way that makes education as accessible as possible, treats crimes and violations
seriously, and offers all due process required under the Constitution, statute, and case law prior
to assigning a sanction to a person found responsible for a violation. In New York, nearly half of
Article 129-B, the longest and most comprehensive state law on point to date, is devoted to due
process and fair process. That is a critical part of the approach. Institutions must always try to
“get it right” when it comes to sanctioning a student. But the law was balanced. It also includes
provisions on consent, amnesty for Reporting Individuals and Bystanders disclosing violence at a
time they were using drugs or alcohol, clear language around confidentiality, mandatory biennial
climate surveys to understand the state of the issue, and clear language about available resources
for all parties. Such a balanced approach has been lauded in New York and looked to elsewhere.
A balanced approach helps a policy change stand the test of time. No one is calling for
drastic changes to the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA), to the VAWA Amendments
to the Clery Act, or to the Negotiated Regulations issued by the Department under that law. Here
in New York, no one is calling for repeal of Education Law Article 129-B. These laws were
drafted with significant input from stakeholders, and with careful consideration to balance and
protect the rights of all interested parties while still addressing important governmental interests.
We urge the Department to re-open consideration of these rules and issue new Proposed
Regulations that balance the rights of the accused with the rights of students to access K-12 and
higher education when faced with harassment and violence. This is a moment where the entire
country is considering issues of harassment in employment and education, athletics, the private
sector, and government. The Department has an opportunity to lead a national conversation
about a balanced approach to harassment and violence in education, to align with laws on the
books, both federally and in laboratory states, and to establish an approach that future
administrations leave undisturbed because, even if not perfect, it is fair, balanced, and flexible to
all different institutions to respond in appropriate ways.
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I.

20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq.: The Proposed Regulations Raise the Cost of Title IX
Compliance for Reasons Unrelated to Redressing Discrimination “On the Basis
of Sex” and In Violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative
Procedure Act

For the reasons detailed below, we do not find in current law the Department’s
jurisdiction to regulate in this precise way. The Department’s proposed due process procedures
violate longstanding precedent requiring balance in due process, and will have unintended
consequences to the detriment of both students who report harassment and those who are
accused. The specific provisions will make the investigation and adjudication of harassment and
violence on our campuses more complex, more difficult, more expensive and far less effective.
A. SUNY Supports Proposals to Align Title IX Procedures with Existing
Federal and State Law and Judicial Authority
Before addressing the myriad reasons we believe parts of these regulations exceed the
Department’s authority, are out of concert with other statutory and regulatory authority as well as
case law, and will make the investigation and adjudication of sexual harassment and sexual
violence less efficient, more error-prone, and less equitable for our students, we wish to point out
a few areas where we strongly agree with the Department.
We applaud the Department’s requirement that cases be investigated and adjudicated by
those sufficiently trained in important concepts central to these investigations, including an
emphasis on the neutral role of institutions, and who are not taught with materials that use sex
stereotypes. 15 The 2013 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Amendments to the Clery Act
and New York State Education Law Article 129-B similarly require comprehensive training, and
SUNY has committed itself to developing and promulgating training materials to help its
campuses, and fellow educational institutions, continuously improve their response to, and
prevention of, sexual harassment and sexual assault. SUNY System Administration and Student
Conduct Institute 16 leadership and staff have hosted hundreds of live and digital trainings over
the last decade. Our campuses have hosted thousands of such trainings as well. We recognize
that, as with any offering of due process and fair process before a government action, the level of
training and preparation is not uniform at all institutions across the country. We hear and support
the continued call of the Department to raise the capacity of professionals at the higher education
and K-12 levels, and SUNY will continue to develop training materials and resources that can be
accessed at no cost or very low cost to help fellow institutions meet this need.

15

U.S. Department of Education, Title IX Proposed Regulations, Vol. 83, Fed. Reg., pp. 61473, 61479, 61483, 61497
(Nov. 29, 2018) (hereinafter referred to as “Title IX Proposed Regulations”).
16
The SUNY Student Conduct Institute (SUNYSCI) is a joint Project of the SUNY Student Conduct Association
(SUNYSCA), SUNY Title IX Coordinators Association (STIXCA), and Office of General Counsel. It provides indepth live and digital training to student conduct officials, hearing officers, Title IX officials and other college
personnel in due process, trauma-informed investigations and adjudications, questioning and weighing of evidence,
and other crucial best practices in the investigation and conduct process that comply with relevant case law, Title IX
guidance, the Clery Act, and New York State Education Law 129-B. Material for training is created with a careful
emphasis on case law, statutory requirements, best practices, and eschewing sex stereotypes. As of the date of this
letter, the Institute had trained well over 600 people in its first half-year of operation. https://system.suny.edu/sci/.
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In considering training, while we applaud the Department’s requirements for training
those that work on the formal grievance process, we would note that the Proposed Regulations
are devoid of any training requirements or professional expectations for staff that work on the
newly elevated informal process. While SUNY does not use an informal process to address cases
of sexual assault (we may use informal processes in certain harassment cases, depending upon
the nature of the conduct and other factors), we acknowledge that some institutions may choose
to do so based upon the imprimatur of the Department. Thus, we urge the Department to set
minimum standards for training in that area as well, so that students are served by individuals
with the highest level of training, regardless of whether they go through a formal or informal
process.
We support the Department’s efforts to standardize the importance of the role of the Title
IX Coordinator at a high level and to require institutions to provide all students and community
members with relevant contact information for the Coordinator. SUNY, through its SAVR
(Sexual Assault and Violence Response) Resource, available at http://response.suny.edu,
provides community members with 24/7, anonymous access to relevant on and off campus
resources including counseling, health, and wellness; Title IX; University Police/Public Safety;
anonymous reporting mechanisms; and disability services on campus. We also provide access to
all known law enforcement, medical, rape crisis, legal resources, and resources specific to
immigrant Reporting Individuals 17 through that same resource. We would happily share this
resource with the Department and other institutions of education to assist them in providing
similar information to their students and community members.
We also thank the Department for acknowledging that its regulations may not violate
rights protected by the Constitution.18 As the Department noted in its Preamble, the previous
Title IX guidance was criticized because it “removed reasonable options for how schools should
structure their grievance processes to accommodate each school’s unique pedagogical mission,
resources, and educational community.” 19 We appreciate the Department’s acknowledgment of
the knowledge and experience of educational institutions and agree that institutions are more
often in a better place to directly speak with students and community members about how best to
meet the challenge of preventing and responding to harassment and violence on campus and in
the community.
While we do not necessarily agree with this determination on policy grounds and believe
it will cause significant confusion with Title VII, state laws on employee harassment, and case
law traditionally interpreting Title IX, we acknowledge that the Department likely has
“prosecutorial discretion” to limit the occasions upon which it will investigate and find an
institution to have violated Title IX. In these Proposed Regulations, the Department has
significantly limited what disclosures are covered under Title IX and, while we again do not
agree on policy grounds, we acknowledge that the Department may expend limited resources in a
17

While the Department uses multiple terms to refer to the person impacted by harassment or violence, we are using
the neutral term Reporting Individual that is outlined and defined in New York State Education Law Article 129-B.
N.Y. EDUC. L. 6439(9).
18
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61495.
19
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61464.
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broad or narrow manner. We appreciate the Department’s acknowledgment that a 60-day
timeline (even if not enforced strictly) poses significant challenges for campuses, especially in
complex cases, and all parties are better served by a flexible standard that requires institutions to
take these cases seriously and address them in a reasonably prompt manner that may be extended
for good cause (which we note should include administrative need), 20 but that does not
shortchange the parties and the need to gather facts and apply law and policy.
B. This Regulation Fails the Standards of Executive Order 13771
The Proposed Regulations should not be exempt from Executive Order 13771, 21 as the
cost savings are inaccurate and exaggerated. Therefore, the Department should identify two
deregulatory actions for each additional regulation added herein. 22 While SUNY supports the
proposals outlined above to the extent they align with existing state and federal law and
constitutional norms of due process, we have significant legal and policy concerns with the
remainder of the Proposed Regulations. First, we disagree that the proposals will lower the
administrative costs of investigating and adjudicating claims of sexual harassment and sexual
violence. Closer examination of the cost-shifting that will occur under the Proposed Regulations
reveals that the Department’s cost estimates are fanciful, and not based on the actual
administrative costs to recipients and the social costs to Reporting Individuals.
Preliminarily, we note that by aligning the standards of actionable harassment for agency
action with the standards used by courts for money judgments, there is no longer any advantage
for Reporting Individuals to seek agency-level redress from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
over the court system, especially since they will not (as has traditionally been the case) be able to
obtain money damages beyond actual expenses through OCR. 23 The burden of showing a Title
IX violation in their specific case through the administrative or judicial process will align. While
this will potentially save resources for OCR with fewer Reporting Individuals able to
successfully seek an investigation of Title IX violation claims, and perhaps in a small way save
resources that institutions would spend going through an OCR program review, this savings will
be eclipsed by the funds institutions will expend to defend the same accusations of Title IX
violations in Article III or state courts.
Additionally, while OCR’s jurisdiction to find an institution in violation of Title IX for
failing a Reporting Individual would all but disappear for most college campuses, Respondents
would maintain robust rights for administrative review, and even the right to have their
determination overturned, through the OCR administrative process with the new rights the
Proposed Regulations award only to Respondents. We believe nearly all Respondents found in
violation will automatically appeal to OCR to have their findings overturned since such an
appeal is free and can only help their position. This will significantly increase the effort and
expenditures of recipients when compared with the far less expensive task of responding to an
20

Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497.
Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 FR 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling-regulatorycosts.
22
A review of the plain language of the requirements reveals nearly 50 new regulatory obligations.
23
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61495.
21
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OCR data request and addressing any issues through the administrative process. It will likewise
clog court dockets with litigation filed by both Reporting Individuals and Respondents and will
not advance the obligations of institutions to decrease the impact of harassment and violence on
access to education.
The Proposed Regulations reshape the Title IX landscape without any true estimate of the
cost. The Department admits that it cannot make such a determination with “absolute precision,”
but estimates that the changes in the Proposed Regulations “would result in a net cost savings of
between $286.4 million to $367.7 million over ten years.” 24 Yet this cost estimate does not
consider in any way the impact of continued exposure to sexual harassment and sexual violence
which would not be investigable and actionable under this regime.
Incredibly, despite the thousands of words devoted to regulating and enforcing brand
new, invasive, and incredibly detailed standards under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, “[t]he Department does not believe it is reasonable to assume that these Proposed
Regulations will have a quantifiable effect on the underlying rate of sexual harassment occurring
in the education programs or activities of recipients.” 25 In other words, these rules will not
effectuate Title IX’s main mission of eliminating the barriers to education that are erected on the
basis of sex. The Department does not even account for the continued impact of harassment and
assault on the basis of sex, or the likelihood that, with fewer allegations investigated, those who
commit harassment and assault will be free to continue to do so towards this specific Reporting
Individual and others. The Department writes that “we do not attempt to capture costs that arise
out of the underlying incidents themselves, but rather those associated with the actions
prescribed by the Proposed Regulations and the likely response of regulated entities to those
proposed requirements.” 26
Yet even ignoring the impact on Reporting Individuals across the country who will not
have their complaints heard and the financial impact on institutions if those exposed to
harassment and assault drop out of college (and if other students are exposed to harassment and
assault by someone who may have been removed from the campus under another process), the
Department ignores or minimizes the steep costs for public and private colleges to maintain an
expanded system of due process as mandated by the Department, and the near certainty that such
elevated requirements—beyond the requirements of any court or statute in the country—will lead
to significant amounts of litigation for institutions.
Such litigation will have direct costs to institutions that will likely have to be passed on to
the end users, students. The insurance company United Educators analyzed 1,000 claims in cases
of Title IX litigation and found the cost of litigation to be high. In just 100 of those cases,
judgments and attorney’s fees cost $21.8 million. United Educators reported that the cost on
average is $350,000 per case. 27 Using those numbers, a mere 1,050 additional cases would
completely wipe out any savings from even the highest savings number estimated by the
24

Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61484.
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485 (emphasis added).
26
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485.
27
Emily Tate, The High (Dollar) Cost of Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 6, 2017), available at
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/06/sexual-assault-claims-can-be-costly.
25
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Department. Considering the detailed requirements and the gray areas they are certain to create,
1,050 additional cases filed over the course of the same 10-year period should be considered a
low estimate.
Further, the savings for institutions are not real because, at least in higher education
institutions, the approach to sexual harassment and assault is likely to remain fairly static, even
for cases that do not meet the narrower definitions of a Title IX violation under these rules. The
VAWA amendments to the Clery Act remain in place, and the same sexual assault report that
may be a form of harassment under these Proposed Regulations would engage those VAWA
requirements. Institutions may have state laws, as here in New York, that maintain obligations.
The Department admits that many institutions are unlikely to change their approach to reports of
sexual harassment and assault, even if they are outside of the narrow scope of the definitions
here. 28 For those institutions (and there are many of them), the costs of investigations and
adjudications will not be reduced; the costs will merely be shifted. Whether the institution
now investigates and adjudicates under the Clery Act requirements, state law, or its own student
conduct code, 29 those same costs will remain. Simply passing them from a Title IX accounting
ledger to a conduct code accounting ledger does not make those expenses disappear.
The Department’s estimates are not accurate because, while for most institutions, the cost
of investigating and adjudicating will not disappear but only shift to other obligations, the costs
of the due process requirements, and their subsequent litigation, will ultimately raise the cost of
compliance for institutions of higher education. We have identified more than four dozen new
regulatory obligations in these Proposed Regulations. To that end, to comply with Executive
Order 13771, 30 this rule should not be allowed to proceed without the Department identifying at
least two deregulatory actions for each of the myriad regulatory additions imposed upon
institutions. 31
We note that these costs will fall hardest on less-resourced institutions, including
community colleges. At many community colleges, there is insufficient staff to fill the myriad
separate positions required by the plain language of these Proposed Regulations and the process
requirements and administrative and judicial litigation costs will cripple many institutions. We
acknowledge that many of our private college counterparts, especially small institutions,
specialized institutions, technical institutions, and religious institutions, are likewise thinly
28

Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485-61486 (“We believe it is highly likely that a subset of recipients have
continued Title IX enforcement in accordance with the prior, now rescinded guidance, due to the uncertainty of the
regulatory Environment...In general, the Department assumes that recipients fall into one of three groups: (1)
Recipients who have complied with the statutory and regulatory requirements and either did not comply with the
2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A or who reduced Title IX activities to the level required by statute and regulation after
the rescission of the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A and will continue to do so; (2) recipients who continued Title IX
activities at the level required by the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A but will amend their Title IX activities to the level
required under current statute and the proposed regulations issued in this proceeding; and (3) recipients who
continued Title IX activities at the level required under the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A and will continue to do so
after final regulations are issued.”).
29
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61486.
30
Exec. Order No. 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 FR 22 (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf.
31
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61484.
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staffed, which will make compliance especially difficult and the administrative and judicial
litigation costs may be ruinous for institutions that already operate on a tight budget.
C. Due Process in Campus Conduct Proceedings
Indeed, the full impact of the Proposed Regulations cannot be understood without
addressing its impact on the cost of adjudicating campus conduct proceedings. Certainly, outside
of the Student Handbook or Code of Conduct’s promises, 32 due process is required at public
institutions whenever a decision excludes the student from the education process for more than a
trivial period or threatens a person’s reputation. 33 Almost all suspensions beyond 10 days or so
are likely to be non-trivial to require some basic due process procedures. 34 As the length of the
suspension increases, those procedures and safeguards may take on an increasingly formal
nature. Under current case law and practice, the due process requirements relax when discipline
is limited to required counseling or classroom reprimand, unless, in some cases, those sanctions
include a potential transcript notation or other designation that may impact a student’s future. 35
Yet the Department now proscribes a one-size-fits-all system that is beyond its authority and
outside the requirements of binding authority.
How is Due Process applied in different contexts?
Procedural due process is intentionally broad and flexible. As explained in more detail
below, in purely academic cases, there are few procedural requirements imposed on the college,
whereas, in student conduct cases at public institutions, notice, hearing, and written decision are
generally required. Substantive due process, on the other hand, always applies. Any decision
subject to due process analysis can be overturned by a court on the grounds of arbitrary decisionmaking. Finally, in the case of sexual assault, domestic or dating violence, or stalking, the form
and standards of the proceedings change to account for the sensitive nature of issues.
Notice
A student must be given notice of the specific charges, the grounds for those charges, and
the names of witnesses against them. 36 The college must generally adhere to the notice deadlines

32

Most or nearly all institutions offer far more process in their code or policies than is legally required and
institutions are generally held to the process they offer under contract law or a related theory.
33
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
34
Id.
35
Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1079
n. 1 (8th Cir. 1969).
36
E.g. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); Goss, 419 U.S. at 582; Gruen v.
Chase, 215 A.D.2d 481 (2d Dep’t 1995); Nawaz v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of Dental Med., 295 A.D.2d 944 (4th Dep’t
2002). Note that while the identity of student witnesses would generally be covered by FERPA within any
documents the witnesses provide in which they are identified, SUNY’s long-standing analysis has been that due
process, which is Constitutional, trumps FERPA, which is statutory/regulatory. Due process requires providing the
names of witnesses, with the exception of extreme cases where providing such identification would endanger the
witnesses. We note that the Proposed Regulations are consistent with this analysis.
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in general outlined in applicable policy. 37 Many colleges also provide notice of the disciplinary
process and the student’s right to a hearing. The notice is intended to provide the student with the
information necessary to prepare a defense, including a description of the basic facts and
evidence. 38 In emergency or exigent circumstances where a student poses a specific health or
safety danger to others or property, a student may be suspended without notice of the charges. 39
However, the student must be given proper notice promptly after the suspension, preferably
within 24 hours. 40
Hearing
Both in cases of academic dishonesty and other discipline, public colleges generally must
provide students with some form of hearing before being suspended or expelled. 41 The hearing
must be scheduled promptly after the process is initiated but also provide the student with
enough time to prepare, 42 and must be before an impartial decision maker. 43 Yet, courts have
never required the hearing to mimic judicial customs and rules. 44 For example, the disciplinary
officer or panel does not need to follow the rules of evidence 45 and can consider any evidence

37

Weidemann v. State Univ. of N.Y. Coll. at Cortland, 188 A.D.2d 974, 975 (3d Dep’t 1992) (Holding a failure to
adhere to the 5-day notice requirement deprived the student of any opportunity to rebut or explain the evidence
against him and violated his rights).
38
See Goss, 419 U.S. at 580 (“No better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”); Blanton v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
489 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1973) (“notice need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal indictment”) (internal
quotations omitted).
39
Schwarzmueller v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 A.D.3d 1117, 1118-19 (3d Dep’t 2013) (holding that
suspending the student immediately after he was released by police at 1 a.m. did not violate due process in light of
the circumstances and the fact he was given notice later that morning); cf. Held v. State Univ. of N.Y. Coll. at
Fredonia, 165 Misc. 2d 577, 579 (Sup. Ct., Chautauqua Cty. 1995) (“The [disciplinary code] provision clearly
recognizes that suspension without hearing (and presumably proper notice) may not be invoked except in limited
cases that come within a finding of the college’s legitimate interest in protecting property and the safety and welfare
of specific individuals or the general public”).
40
See Schwarzmueller, 105 A.D.3d at 1119.
41
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard”); see also
Mary M. v. Clark, 100 A.D.2d 41 (3d Dep’t 1984); Budd v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Geneseo, 133 A.D.3d 1341, 1342
(4th Dep’t 2015).
42
Compare Held, 165 Misc.2d at 582 (expressing the need to provide a student sufficient time to prepare for a
hearing) with Machosky v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Oswego, 145 Misc.2d 210 (Oswego Cty. 1989) (holding
unnecessary delays in scheduling the hearing deprived the student of significant rights).
43
See Marshall v. Maguire, 102 Misc.2d 697, 699 (Nassau Cty. 1980) (overturning college board decision where the
Associate Dean served on both the initial decision-making committee and the review board); Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967) (indicating that prior involvement in an investigation renders impartiality difficult
to maintain and holding the student was entitled to show that members of the panel with prior contact with the case
could be presumed to have been biased).
44
See Dixon, v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d at 159; Fain v. Brooklyn Coll. of the City of N.Y., 112 A.D.2d
992 (2d Dep’t 1985) (“Despite the informality of the hearing and the committee’s failure to adhere to the question
and answer format, petitioners were afforded a full opportunity to explain their actions and confront their
accusers.”).
45
Monnat v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Canton, 125 A.D.3d 1176, 1177 (3d Dep’t 2015) (holding where the code
indicated the Hearing Board was not bound by rules of evidence and free to consider any information “relevant to
the charges that would contribute to the rendering of an impartial and fair judgment,” it was not improper to
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“relevant to the charges that would contribute to the rendering of an impartial and fair
judgment.” 46 At the hearing, students are entitled to present their side of the story, including
evidence and witnesses to support their claims. 47 However, absent campus rules (which are
common) or specific legal requirements to the contrary, a student generally does not have the
right to cross-examine witnesses directly or through a panel. 48 Finally, many schools offer
students the ability to choose an advisor to help them in the disciplinary process. Colleges may
limit the role the advisor plays and, except in cases of sexual and interpersonal violence, colleges
may place limits on who may serve as an advisor. 49 When a student is given a choice of advisor,
the college may need to make reasonable but not unlimited accommodations to ensure that
advisor is available for the student to ensure the student’s right is effectuated. 50
Decision
After the hearing, the student is entitled to a written decision. 51 That decision should
describe the factual findings and the evidence relied upon in reaching the determination of
responsibility. It must be specific enough to permit the student to effectively challenge the
determination in administrative appeals or the courts and to demonstrate that the decision was
based on the evidence in the record. 52 Therefore, conclusory references to source documents or
testimony are insufficient to satisfy due process. For example, it is insufficient to simply state
that one student harassed another based on the testimony of a police officer. Instead, the
determination should describe the facts about which the witness testified, such as the violations
with which the student was charged, and why that witness was credible. 53
Substantial Evidence
Substantive due process requires that all disciplinary decisions are based on the evidence
and the rules. 54 The required evidentiary standards, such as the “preponderance of the evidence”

consider prior disciplinary history or other uncharged conduct); Budd, 133 A.D.3d at 1344 (upholding a disciplinary
decision based on hearsay evidence).
46
Monnat, 125 A.D.3d at 1177.
47
However, such right is not unlimited; for example, a student may be restricted from calling character witnesses.
See Schwarzmueller, 105 A.D.3d at 1119.
48
See, e.g., Dixon, 294 F.2d at 159; Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; Gruen, 215 A.D.2d at 482; but see Donohue v. Baker,
976 F. Supp. 136, 146-47 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
49
Gruen, 215 A.D.2d at 482.
50
Machosky, 145 Misc.2d at 214 (“Given the extreme prejudice,…and given that there were no prior requests by
petitioner for any adjournment or other abuse of the disciplinary process by the petitioner, the failure to afford the
petitioner an opportunity to have an advisor present at the hearing was violative of his legal rights.”). However,
these accommodations must be reasonable. A student may not use the choice of an advisor to delay or stall the
conduct process.
51
Kalinsky v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 161 A.D.2d 1006, 1007 (3d Dep’t 1990); Boyd v. State Univ. of
N.Y. at Cortland, 110 A.D.3d 1174, 1175-76 (3d Dep’t 2013).
52
Id.
53
These were the facts of Boyd v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Cortland, 110 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dep’t 2013).
54
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803.
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standard, are determined in the Code of Conduct. Generally, the judicial officer will be given
deference in credibility determinations. 55
The preponderance of the evidence standard is applied in most administrative settings,
including all federal civil rights cases. 56 By allowing recipients to choose a higher standard of
proof, the Department treats those who disclose sexual harassment and sexual violence
differently than others who disclose discrimination, without any reasoned explanation.
In drawing the ultimate legal conclusions, courts review decisions to ensure a sufficient
factual basis exists to support those findings. Speculation, conjecture, and suspicion are
insufficient to reach the necessary threshold. 57 The court will review the record and will
generally defer to the college’s decision if it finds sufficient facts to allow a reasonable person to
reach the same decision. 58 This standard applies even if the reviewing federal or state judge
would have decided the case differently.
In sum, procedural due process is not a one-size-fits-all standard in the student conduct
forum. As will be discussed in greater detail, below, the Department’s Proposed Regulations
seek to remove the flexibility afforded to recipients in investigating and adjudicating sexual
misconduct in a manner outside its authority and well beyond the requirements of statute and
binding legal precedent.
D. The Department’s Regulations, as Proposed, Violate the Administrative
Procedure Act, are Arbitrary and Capricious and Cannot Withstand Judicial
Scrutiny
Not only do the Proposed Regulations promise to raise administrative costs for recipients
and OCR and social costs to Reporting Individuals and Respondents without a basis in wellestablished judicial precedent, they likely cannot withstand judicial scrutiny if enacted in their
current form. Chevron deference is not absolute. Courts will overturn agency interpretations of
statutes that are arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure
Act, 59 and will not countenance agency rulemaking that is pretextual or breaks with settled
policy without a good reason. Here, the proposals cannot hold the force of law because they
manifestly contradict the text and purpose of Title IX, reverse the Department’s long-standing
interpretations of the statute, and may be dressed in a pretextual rationale. Simply put, the
55

Lambraia v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 A.D.3d 1144, 1146 (3d Dep’t 2015); In re Lampert v. State
Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 116 A.D.3d 1292, 1294 (3d Dep’t 2014).
56
See, K.K. Baker, D.L. Brake and N.C. Cantalupo, Title IX & The Preponderance of the Evidence: A White Paper
(Aug. 7, 2016), retrieved from https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Title-IXPreponderance-White-Paper-signed-8.7.16.pdf; Amy Chmielewski, Comment, Defending the Preponderance of the
Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 143.
57
Fain, 112 A.D.2d at 994 (holding that “a mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to justify a suspicion is not
sufficient” and the record lacked proof of sufficient quality and quantity to persuade a fair and detached fact-finder
“reasonably, probatively, and logically”).
58
Esmail v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. at Brooklyn, 220 A.D.2d 328 (1st Dep’t 1995) provides an example of the
analysis for academic dismissal. Katz v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 85 A.D.3d 1277, 1280 (3d Dep’t 2011),
provides an example for academic dishonesty cases. Finally, Lambraia, 135 A.D.3d 1144 (3d Dep’t 2015), provides
an example in the realm of behavioral conduct cases.
59
5 U.S.C.A. § 706.
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Department has not offered a scintilla of evidence to show that its proposals are necessary to
remedy discrimination on the basis of sex. Without such evidence of discrimination on the basis
of sex, or an explanation for why its Proposed Regulations ameliorate this putative sex
discrimination, the rulemaking is without legal substance, and the Proposed Regulations cannot
have the force of law.
i. There Is No Evidence That These Regulations Are Aimed at Reducing
Discrimination or Unequal Treatment On The Basis of Sex
The Department clearly has the right to regulate under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 in a way that addresses unequal treatment on the basis of sex. But there
must be some evidence that the regulation is promulgated to address inequality or discrimination
on the basis of sex. Undoubtedly, through its request for comments, the Department has received
references to dozens of studies of populations in college, secondary education, and society-wide
showing a clear and statistically significant difference in the percentage of males versus females
who are subject to sexual harassment, sexual violence and unequal treatment on the basis of sex.
Approximately 1 in 5 females report in climate surveys that they have experienced nonconsensual sex in their college years, while 1 in 13 males report the same, with transgender
students generally reporting even higher rates. 60 Simply analyzing identified male and female
experiences with harassment shows that it has a differential impact on the basis of gender.
Therefore, the Department would be on fairly solid ground requiring educational institutions to
offer resources aimed at ameliorating the impact of such discrimination for which the impact
differs so much by gender, and requiring institutions to take it seriously and pursue
investigations and adjudications to sanction those who violate the law and policy. That
requirement would be tied to serious, published and peer-reviewed studies that consistently show
a differential impact in victimization and educational and employment impact between genders.
Conversely, the Department presents no such published study showing that a complete
lack of due process, traditional due process owed under case law, or the new maximized due
process envisioned in these Proposed Regulations differently impacts people on the basis of sex.
The Department has not shown or referenced any evidence that due process differences affect
people differently on the basis of sex.
The Preamble—which provides the Secretary’s reasons for issuing these Proposed
Regulations— lacks an evidentiary showing sufficient to establish the facts by which the agency
makes such a critical determination—one that promises to fundamentally shift the effectiveness
of Title IX as a tool for preventing and adjudicating harassment and violence and certainly shifts
the population of interest to be protected under this Civil Rights law from those limited in
educational access when subject to sex-based harassment or assault to those accused of
harassment or assault under Title IX. It does not identify what data within its cited literature
informs its decision and why that data dictates the present changes. Without more specific

60

See e.g. David Cantor, Bonnie Fisher, Susan Chibnall, Reanne Townsend, Report on the AAU Campus Climate
Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct, Association of American Universities (Oct. 20, 2017), available
at https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Campus-Safety/AAU-Campus-Climate-SurveyFINAL-10-20-17.pdf.
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information, the public has no basis for understanding how that literature led the agency to
reverse its long-standing interpretation of Title IX.
The Secretary’s opinion on the matter, moreover, is not the kind of evidence-based
decision-making that our courts expect of agencies. It may be that the Secretary disfavors the
Department’s current guidance, but she does not have the unilateral authority to cancel it without
following the APA. The agency must proceed along the legal channels, including setting forth a
particularized rationale for the reversal.
The closest item in the Preamble approximating evidence are references to statistics,
drawn from a website maintained by a historian, K.C. Johnson, that over two hundred “students”
have sued their institutions for due process violations since the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
(2011 DCL), and that ninety institutions have “lost” due process challenges brought by
Respondents since 2011 DCL. Most experts would not give such credit to non-peer reviewed
research, housed on a web link by an activist with a clear agenda (and an interest in selling
books). A cursory review shows that the list is far from comprehensive and is shaded towards
cases that will support the professor’s viewpoint, while leaving out or minimizing cases that may
not. Certainly, even if taken as true, two hundred cases amidst the tens of millions of students
who have attended college over the past decade should not be the factual basis for a landmark
reversal of federal policy. What is clear on its face is that these statistics, standing alone, do not
demonstrate that the Proposed Regulations specific to due process are needed to prevent
discrimination on the basis of sex.
For one thing, many of the two hundred “students” who have sued their institutions
pursuant to the private right of action recognized under Title IX are actually Reporting
Individuals alleging that the institution acted in “deliberate indifference” to their Title IX rights.
Elevating the due process protections afforded to accused students will do nothing to ameliorate
harms to the Title IX rights of such Reporting Individuals. For another, the assertion that
institutions “lost” ninety legal challenges by Respondents is highly misleading. Professor
Johnson trumpeted that SUNY “lost” a student conduct case in a mid-level appeals court, but did
not make such a fuss when that same case was reversed by a nearly unanimous Court of Appeals
(New York’s highest court) in SUNY’s favor. 61 In the bulk of the cases cited in Professor
Johnson’s spreadsheet, the Respondent “won” by overcoming an institution’s motion to dismiss
the complaint or deny an application for temporary or permanent injunction. The most likely
inference we can draw from this limited outcome data is that the courts determined that the
Respondent alleged facts which, if proven true, could support a claim of discrimination by the
institution on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX.
Clearing a procedural hurdle is not the same as proving a case of discrimination. The
spreadsheet does not support a conclusion that these violations occurred as a matter of fact, only
that some courts hold that the complaints, as pleaded, could support a claim of Title IX
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Haug v. State Univ. of New York at Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), rev’d, 32 N.Y.3d 1044
(2018).
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discrimination as a matter of law. 62 Simply asserting that the case was withdrawn and settled,
moreover, is not evidence that the institution admitted fault.
The spreadsheet is not comprehensive of the state of Title IX case law. The spreadsheet is
not designed to track how many institutions have “won” due process challenges and, of course,
the spreadsheet cannot report on how many lawsuits are never brought in the first place because
the Respondent or Reporting Individual found the process generally fair (even if they do not
agree with the outcome) or could not identify a challengeable error. The spreadsheet also, in an
effort to include state-level counterparts to Title IX, it cites state case law arising from violations
of state law, rather than Title IX. 63 These cases may be dispositive of general principles of due
process, but are not relevant to the rights guaranteed under Title IX. By mixing these types of
cases, it creates a database that is far from a neutral, scholarly, thorough, complete, and accurate
collection upon which to base a fundamental reversal of decades of agency policy and practice. 64
At best, this list of cases could offer a legal syllabus of how selected courts interpret the
contours of due process in the student conduct forum. But, without exploring the merits of each
case, the list offers no information about how any institution has actually violated Title IX and
whether such violations have a disparate impact by gender, nor does it explain why the
Department must abruptly change decades of consistent interpretations of the statute to address
such alleged violations. Without such evidence, the Department does not have jurisdiction under
Title IX to force nearly every school district, college, and university in the United States to
require these procedural due process protections for Respondents and, even if it did, the
proposals could effectively force these recipients to violate the statute by treating those who
disclose sexual harassment and sexual assault unequally.
After all, in its thirty-seven words, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
specifically prohibits any person, “on the basis of sex,” from being “excluded from participation
in, be[ing] denied the benefits of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 65 Nothing in the statute or its history
remotely suggests a Congressional intent to elevate the due process rights of those accused of
harassment or assault over the minimums established by the U.S. Supreme Court, at great cost to
those whose educational access was limited by harassment or assault.
To the contrary, both the Department and the judiciary have consistently interpreted Title
IX to prohibit sexual harassment and sexual violence of all forms at schools receiving federal
assistance. Sexual harassment and sexual violence can create hostile environments that interfere
with the ability of students to receive equitable access to education free from discrimination on
the basis of sex. In turn, to assist school districts, colleges, and universities in meeting their
obligations to fairly and promptly investigate and adjudicate incidents of sexual harassment and
62

Remember that in consideration of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, courts are obligated to
reasonably construe all facts in favor of the non-moving party. This does not mean those “facts” are “true” or that
they would be proven at trial.
63
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Blaise, 157 A.D.3d 1072 (3d Dep’t 2018) (violation of New York Education Law 129-B).
64
See generally FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-587 (1993); Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
65
20 U.S.C.A. § 1681.
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violence, the Department and its Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a Dear Colleague letter on
April 4, 2011 (2011 DCL). 66 The 2011 DCL supplemented the “Revised Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties,”
issued January 19, 2001 (2001 Guidance), 67 by the OCR under the Clinton Administration
(which was very similar to guidance issued on March 13, 1997), 68 and then reissued January 25,
2006, by the OCR under the Bush Administration. 69 OCR then issued its “Questions and
Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence” on April 29, 2014 (2014 Q&A), which provided
additional assistance in implementing the 2011 DCL and the 2001 Guidance. 70
These documents, along with Resolution Agreements that school districts, colleges, and
universities have entered into with OCR to settle alleged Title IX violations or compliance
reviews, demonstrate a consistent, bipartisan understanding that Title IX prohibits these
institutions from discriminating against those who disclose sexual harassment and violence. The
Department recognized this consistent tradition in the Preamble, detailing the history of subregulatory guidance issued in this area. 71 It did not mention, however, that for the most part this
sub-regulatory guidance was consistent over the course of more than twenty years, with
comparatively minor deviations. Indeed the Department’s consistent interpretation, across
administrations from different political parties, has been in place for so long that it is older than
nearly all current K-12 students and more than half of all college students.
This consistency lasted until the Department announced a marked shift in interpretation
of the role of Title IX in September 2017. The Secretary announced that OCR would commence
a formal notice and comment period to replace the 2011 DCL, and then issued a Dear Colleague
Letter (the 2017 DCL) rescinding the 2011 DCL and 2014 Q&A and advising recipients to
follow the 2001 Guidance. 72
Plainly, the Department now offers a mistaken understanding of its own regulatory
system surrounding Title IX. Its Proposed Regulations distort the beneficial impact that Title IX
has had on protecting Reporting Individuals and ensuring a fair process for all parties in campus
disciplinary proceedings. The detailed due process provisions of the Proposed Regulations may
or may not be a good idea. But the Department does not have jurisdiction to mandate “good
ideas” or “best practices.” It is not a consulting firm. The Department only maintains jurisdiction
66

OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011), available at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “2011 DCL”).
67
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT
OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “2001 guidance”).
68
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 FR 12034 (March 13, 1997).
69
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/sexhar-2006.html.
70
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014), available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf
(hereinafter referred to as “2014 Q&A”).
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Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61463.
72
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (Sept. 1, 2017),
available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “2017
DCL”).
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under this Civil Rights law to regulate in a way that reduces discrimination on the basis of sex.
Even conceding for the sake of argument that a Respondent, if treated improperly, could be a
victim of discrimination on the basis of sex, the Department still must show that the current
system is actually allowing discrimination on the basis of sex. The Department has not shown
that Respondents are predominantly male. It may assume so based on the few conversations it
held with activists in preparation for drafting these Proposed Regulations, but there is no actual
evidence this is so.
Further, even if most Respondents were male, there is no evidence that they are held
responsible more or less often than females, that their sanctions are greater or lesser than
females, or that these additional due process requirements would change that. The Department
must regulate within its jurisdiction. There is no evidence here that the current system of
investigating and adjudicating sexual harassment and violence leads to disparate treatment on the
basis of sex. There is no evidence that these Proposed Regulations would lessen such disparate
impact. The Department simply does not have jurisdiction to regulate in this way, and cannot do
so without some evidence that this is not a solution in search of a problem but an evidence-based
method of addressing a problem of unequal treatment on the basis of sex.
ii. Chevron Deference is Not Absolute, and Agency Rulemaking Cannot
Be Arbitrary and Capricious
We point the Department to this evidentiary gap because it reveals the fundamental legal
issues with the instant rulemaking. As the Department is aware, the U.S. Supreme Court holds
that when Congress authorizes an agency to issue regulations, and that agency creates a
regulation interpreting a statute it enforces, those regulations will only be given controlling
weight if they obey the two-part test described in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. 73 The judiciary need only defer to the agency’s interpretation, first, if the
statute is ambiguous as to the precise question at issue, and, second, if the interpretation
reasonably resolves those ambiguities. 74
The Chevron court understood that agencies balance competing interests in formulating
policy. It recognized that an agency’s interpretation may reflect a “reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute,” yet still may not
warrant deference if “it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” 75 As such, the interpretation cannot manifestly
offend the text and purpose of the statute. 76
Chevron built on well-established standards of review of agency action derived from the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 77 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held agency
regulations to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, invalidating regulations where
73

Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
75
Id. at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76
Id. at 844.
77
5 U.S.C.A. § 706.
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the agency “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” 78 Regulations may also be set aside where
they are contrary to a Constitutional right, made in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of
procedure, and not supported by substantial evidence. 79
Fundamentally, an agency’s regulatory action will be arbitrary and capricious—and
therefore cannot carry the force of law—when the agency does not “examine the relevant data
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.” 80 Courts require agencies to detail the “essential facts upon
which the administrative decision was based” and “may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.” 81 Courts also demand that agencies explain
their decision-making rationale in response to significant comments made during the rulemaking procedure. 82 Courts also will invalidate regulations that are facially illogical, such as
policies that conflict with other agency regulations and create a “back door” allowing the agency
to circumvent its own rules. 83 And they will deem a regulation arbitrary and capricious where the
agency adopts a more restrictive means of achieving a policy goal without explaining why less
restrictive means were inadequate. 84
In January, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
a textbook example of illegal rulemaking in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in State
of New York v. Department of Commerce. 85 There, the Department of Commerce inserted a
question in the 2020 Census that would ask respondents their citizenship, even as this question
contradicted longstanding practice and the agency’s own experts objected to it. The Court stated
that the Commerce Secretary “failed to consider several important aspects of the problem;
alternately ignored, cherry-picked, or badly misconstrued the evidence in the record before him;
acted irrationally both in light of that evidence and his own stated decisional criteria; and failed
to justify significant departures from past policies and practices — a veritable smorgasbord of
classic, clear-cut APA violations.” 86 The court declared this process a sham, wherein the agency
78

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983);
5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2)(A). See, also, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 1101, 1124
(9th Cir. 2012) (agency’s failure to consider policy impacts of decision); Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v.
Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 429 F.3d 1136, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (agency’s failure to consider vital aspects
of the problem before it).
79
5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2)(B) - (E).
80
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc., 463 U.S. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams Gas
Processing-Gulf Coast Co., L.P. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (agency determination devoid of
reasoned decision-making must be set aside).
81
United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915, 926 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82
Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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Cin. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1995).
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New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-CV-2921 (JMF), 2019 WL 190285 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
2019), available at
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491254/gov.uscourts.nysd.491254.166.0.pdf.
86
Id. at 225-245.
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pursued a single-minded goal of adding the citizenship question even as the “real” reason for the
decision was outside the pretext of enhancing enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. 87
Thus, precedent is clear that administrative agencies are not above the law, and courts
take seriously their obligations to evaluate whether the agency’s stated rationale for rulemaking
is supported by the evidence. The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction, and it will reject administrative constructions that conflict with clear congressional
intent. 88
iii. Agencies Cannot Revoke Long-Standing Guidance Without Good
Reasons
The Department need also be aware that sudden reversals in policy may be unlawful,
even where the revoked policy was not a regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that
“regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever,” but cautions that “the
forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of deregulation.” 89 When an
agency upends its own interpretation of a statute, courts require a showing of “good reasons for
the new policy,” including “a reasoned explanation” for disregarding facts and circumstances
underlying the former policy. 90 Particularly where the change in policy “could necessitate
systemic, significant changes” to stakeholders’ practices, the agency owes more than
“conclusory statements” to justify the interpretation. 91
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Encino Motorcars has affirmed Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in FCC v. Fox Television Stations that an agency’s decision to change
course may be arbitrary and capricious where it ignores or contradicts its earlier factual findings
without a good reason. 92 Encino Motorcars arose from an agency rulemaking with parallel flaws
to this current process. In that case, the Department of Labor, which is charged with interpreting
and enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), issued an “interpretive regulation” in 1970
that a service advisor who sold maintenance and repair services at an automobile dealership was
not a “salesman” exempt from receiving overtime compensation. 93 Following several court cases
that rejected this interpretation, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter in 1978 that
changed its position and aligned with those court decisions. 94 This guidance made clear that
service advisors were exempt employees who were not required to receive overtime
compensation under the FLSA. 95 Twenty-one years later, in 2008, the Department of Labor
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would hold service advisors to be exempt. 96 Then, in
2011, the Department of Labor reversed course, and completed its 2008 notice-and-comment
87

Id. at 245-253.
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rulemaking by issuing a final rule that went back to the 1970 guidance. 97 Service advisors were
again entitled to overtime compensation. 98
Based on that sudden reversal in policy, a group of service advisors sued their employer,
claiming violations of the FLSA. 99 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court threw out the final rule,
holding that the regulation “was issued without the reasoned explanation that was required in
light of the Department of Labor’s change in position and the significant reliance interests
involved.” 100 The Department of Labor referenced comments made for and against the proposal,
but then gave no actual reason why it believed one approach was more reasonable than the
other. 101 It also made no effort to sort out inconsistencies in its regulation, which would exempt
dealership employees who sold vehicles but not exempt dealership employees who sold
services. 102 Conclusory statements were not enough to satisfy this burden. 103
Clearly, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 7-2 decision in Encino Motorcars, an agency
exceeds its jurisdiction when it revokes a longstanding policy without providing a good reason,
even if that policy constituted sub-regulatory guidance. Yet the Department of Education has
offered nothing but conclusory statements to justify this change. Here, the Proposed Regulations
acknowledge that the Department has been issuing guidance on the proper interpretation and
enforcement of Title IX in the campus disciplinary process for decades. It also acknowledges the
force of this guidance, as it putatively has “created” a process followed by recipients of federal
funds. 104 Yet it has suddenly reversed course, with no reasoned explanation for why it has upset
decades of settled practice.
To be sure, the Department never “created” the disciplinary process, nor does the
Department have jurisdiction to mandate such a top-down system under Title IX. It is more
accurate to say that the Department’s Office for Civil Rights enforces Title IX through campus
investigations, and its approach has encouraged recipients to reform their practices to conform
with investigatory standards and outcomes. Moreover, individuals have spurred reform by filing
complaints with OCR claiming that campuses are failing to live up to their Title IX obligations.
OCR follows a Case Processing Manual to determine if the institution is in violation. Institutions
such as SUNY have relied for decades on this guidance material in shaping their campus
responses to sexual harassment and sexual violence.
Additionally, students, faculty, staff, and third-parties have long relied on this guidance in
understanding their Title IX rights. Those individuals can bring private lawsuits against
universities for not following Title IX. This private right of action has led universities to reform
their practices to avoid liability. Nearly forty years ago, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
97
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held in Alexander v. Yale University that a university could be held liable under Title IX for
failing to take seriously allegations of “quid pro quo” sexual harassment between a female
student and a male faculty member or administrator. 105 The students in Alexander alleged that
the university was obliged under Title IX to address sexual harassment, because this misconduct
compromised their ability to access the educational benefits provided by the university. 106
Although the plaintiffs in Alexander did not prevail in their claims, the case led universities to
implement grievance procedures for preventing, investigating, and adjudicating sexual
harassment.
The U.S. Supreme Court then expanded the scope of institutional liability in two cases
during the late 1990s. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Court identified a
private right of action under Title IX against recipients for teacher-on-student sexual
harassment. 107 One year later, the Court held in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education that
a school could be liable for monetary damages under Title IX if it was “deliberately indifferent”
to student-on-student harassment about which it had “actual” knowledge. 108 The harassment had
to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived the impacted students of
access to the benefits of education.
In light of Gebser and Davis, the Department sought public comments regarding a
school’s obligation to take affirmative steps to prevent, investigate, and adjudicate sexual
harassment. In 2001, it published its Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, which updated
nearly identical guidance published in 1997. This Guidance affirmed that institutions were
responsible for incidents of student-on-student sexual harassment.
The 2001 Guidance meshed the definition of sexual harassment in Davis applicable to
private causes of action for money damages with the “core factors” previously offered by the
Department of Education in a 1997 guidance letter for determining the appropriate institutional
response. 109 Specifically, institutions must examine the “constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships” to determine whether the conduct is “sufficiently
serious that it adversely affects a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the school’s
program.” 110 The 2001 Guidance also created a wide scope of responsibility for preventing
sexual harassment and violence. The institution has a duty to prevent and address discrimination
throughout its operations, “whether they take place in the facilities of the school, on a school bus,
at a class or training program sponsored by the school at another location, or elsewhere.” 111
Because Title IX protects any “person” from sex discrimination, students of all genders may
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bring complaints of harassment. Students are protected from harassment by a school employee,
another student, or a non-employee third party, like a visiting speaker or visiting athlete. 112
Contrary to the Department’s revisionist history, the Department has followed a
consistent policy regarding the application of Title IX as an anti-violence and anti-harassment
tool for decades. The 2011 Dear Colleague letter, in turn, reinforced these policies and clarified
certain ambiguities in the 2001 notice-and-comment guidance, such as holding that Title IX
applies “in connection with all the academic, educational, extracurricular, athletic, and other
programs of the school . . .” including those activities occurring off-campus or on a study abroad
program. 113 The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter also included third-parties under the umbrella of the
school’s protection. “For example, Title IX protects a high school student participating in a
college’s recruitment program, a visiting student athlete, and a visitor in a school’s on-campus
residence hall.” 114 It also set forth preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof in
cases of sexual misconduct.
The Department’s apparent legal position is that it can abandon its longstanding
interpretation of Title IX, without any explanation grounded in evidence, simply because its
former interpretation was not a regulation. Yet under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 115 courts give
significant deference to agency interpretations that speak from the agency’s expertise, are
thoroughly considered, and are consistent with prior interpretations. 116 As such, the
Department’s more than twenty years of guidance on this issue—including policies put into
place following notice-and-comment—have heavy legal weight that cannot be abandoned
without a good reason. Yet the dearth of evidence offered in the Proposed Regulations makes it
difficult to argue that these proposals were the product of agency expertise. The Preamble offers
nothing but conclusory statements to justify the Department’s abrupt reversal.
iv. The Proposed Rules Are Inconsistent with the 2013 VAWA
Reauthorization (Campus SaVE Act) and Enacting Regulations
The Department must also account for why it acts in derogation of congressional intent
and its own interpretation of that intent. 117 Less than six years ago, Congress passed legislation
that specifically defines what due process rights it demands for campus adjudications of sexual
misconduct, and the Department promulgated regulations to enforce that law. Nowhere did
Congress manifest an intent that the Department should consider the elevated due process
protections accumulated in the instant Proposed Regulations. To the contrary, the Proposed
Regulations’ elevated emphasis on the rights of the accused undermine Congress’ wishes by
relying on factors that Congress never intended to be considered and departs from the due
process balance struck by Congress.
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In 2013, Congress reauthorized the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which
was signed into law on March 7, 2013. The relevant provisions of this law are also known as the
Campus SaVE Act. Among other things, this law amended Section 485(f) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA), better known as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security
Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act). VAWA amended the Clery Act to require
institutions to compile statistics for incidents of dating violence, domestic violence, sexual
assault, and stalking, and to include policies, procedures, and programs regarding these incidents
in their annual security reports.
In amending the Clery Act, VAWA set forth specific standards of due process that
colleges and universities had to apply in proceedings arising from incidents of sexual assault and
related crimes and violations. Those proceedings had to “provide a prompt, fair, and impartial
investigation and resolution” by officials with “annual training on the issues related to domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking and how to conduct an investigation and
hearing process that protects the safety of victims and promotes accountability.” The Reporting
Individual and the Respondent were “entitled to the same opportunities to have others present
during an institutional disciplinary proceeding, including the opportunity to be accompanied to
any related meeting or proceeding by an advisor of their choice” and shared the right to
simultaneous written notification of the outcome of the proceeding, any appeal procedures, and
when the results became final. 118
The Department enacted regulations after a Negotiated Rulemaking process in a manner
designed to implement Congress’ intent of preventing sexual violence and promoting the fair
adjudication of campus sexual misconduct. In doing so, the Department did not interpret the
phrase “prompt, fair, and impartial investigation and resolution” in Section
485(f)(8)(B)(iv)(I)(aa) to require any of the elevated due process protections for the accused now
under consideration.
As to the role of the advisor, the Department considered comments asking it to
specifically define the role of the advisor in campus proceedings, to which it demurred; the
Department found that “regulating an institution’s actions in these areas would restrict their
flexibility to protect the interests of all parties.” 119 Blanket rules about the role of the advisor
would “unnecessarily limit an institution’s flexibility to provide an equitable and appropriate
disciplinary proceeding.” 120
Contrary to its present position, the Department did not interpret the Clery Act
amendments to require the presence of an advisor at all. This function was at the parties’ option,
but not mandatory, and institutions would not run afoul of the law if a properly notified advisor
did not attend the proceeding. 121 Indeed, the Department specifically rejected a proposal that
would require institutions to provide legal representation in a meeting or hearing in which the
accused or accuser has legal representation but the other party does not. “Absent clear and
118
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unambiguous statutory authority,” the Department wrote at the time, “we would not impose such
a burden on institutions.” 122
The Department’s current proposals elevate the due process rights of the accused in ways
never anticipated by the drafters of the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act. Its present
interpretation of Title IX is incompatible with its regulations implementing the Clery Act
amendments, demonstrating another ground by which its present rulemaking is arbitrary and
capricious as allowing the agency to circumvent its own regulations and offending the clear
intent of Congress on the issue of procedural due process in campus sexual assault
proceedings. 123
v. The Proposed Rules May Prove to Be a Pretext for Otherwise
Unlawful Agency Action
The sum total of this analysis is that a court may find that the Department has acted in a
manner designed to hide its true purpose in pursuing these Proposed Regulations. As the January
2019 decision in State of New York v. Department of Commerce shows, courts will look beyond
the “presumption of regularity” afforded Executive Branch officials where they cannot escape
the conclusion that the agency’s stated rationale was not the true reason for its actions, and may
look both within the administrative record and outside of it to identify if the stated reason for
acting was just a pretext masking an unstated goal. 124 There, the Secretary of Commerce decided
to add the citizenship question to the census for reasons unrelated to Voting Rights Act
enforcement before he involved the Department of Justice. The evidence showed that his aides
sought to conceal aspects of the process and set aside “near uniform opposition” from experts
about the citizenship question. 125 The agency’s obfuscation and demonstrated unwillingness to
consider alternative arguments showed that the Secretary of Commerce had prejudged the
outcome regardless of the evidence. 126
Respectfully, the Department is proceeding along a similar path. The Department has
entered the rulemaking process having decided that the due process afforded to Respondents in
disciplinary proceedings violates Title IX’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex. It
has offered a series of proposals that it believes will correct this putative imbalance. Yet it has
not produced any evidence to support its belief that these measures are needed to address sexbased discrimination, or even any evidence that sex-based discrimination exists against
Respondents. Making such a critical change without any explanation may be found to be an
arbitrary and capricious act. 127
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Surely, the Department is aware that the public’s response to its “opening bid” in this
process, the 2017 DCL, was nearly universally negative. According to a survey of 12,035
comments received by the Department in the wake of the 2017 DCL, ninety-nine percent of the
commenters filed a comment in support of Title IX, with ninety-seven percent of the Title IX
supporters specifically asking the Department to maintain the 2011 DCL. 128 Only one percent of
the writers offered comments opposing Title IX, of which just 123 letters supported rescinding
the 2011 DCL. 129 This interpretation elevates the needle over the entire haystack, and is not the
basis for an evidence-based determination. 130
Prior to even engaging in this process, the then-Assistant Secretary showed that the
determinations of how to regulate had already been made, telling the New York Times that
“[i]nvestigative processes have not been ‘fairly balanced between the accusing victim and the
accused student,’…and students have been branded rapists ‘when the facts just don’t back that
up.’ In most investigations, she said, there’s ‘not even an accusation that these accused students
overrode the will of a young woman…Rather, the accusations — 90 percent of them — fall into
the category of ‘we were both drunk,’ ‘we broke up, and six months later I found myself under a
Title IX investigation because she just decided that our last sleeping together was not quite
right.’” 131 The Assistant Secretary later apologized for her statement. 132
Having released its Proposed Regulations without considering the overwhelming support
of these commenters to the pre-2017 DCL, the Proposed Regulations weaken the core goal of
Title IX as a means of preventing and redressing campus sexual harassment and assault, even if
their stated goal is otherwise. Line-by-line, the Proposed Regulations discourage reporting and
raise the cost of handling complaints, raising the due process floor in ways sometimes not even
required in the criminal justice system. Yet the department has offered no evidence that requiring
such protections is necessary to stop discrimination on the basis of sex against people accused of
sexual violence and harassment, nor a reasoned explanation for why such extreme measures are
needed, when less restrictive means could prove adequate. 133
At the same time, the Department has not considered the impact these elevated
protections will have on individuals who have relied on Title IX for decades to prevent and
address campus sexual assault. The Department writes that it “does not believe it is reasonable to
128
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assume that these Proposed Regulations will have a quantifiable effect on the underlying rate of
sexual harassment occurring in the education programs or activities of recipients.” 134 This
statement is surprising. If implemented as proposed, these regulations would offend Title IX by
allowing institutions to treat those who disclose sexual harassment, assault, and violence
unequally. The chilling effect on Reporting Individuals would be immediate, and, without a
robust and credible infrastructure for addressing these claims, rates of sexual harassment would
remain the same or even increase, all for a new regime that the Department does not even believe
will reduce discrimination.
Ultimately, the Proposed Regulations present a solution in search of a problem. Its
authors insist that a lack of “clear regulatory standards” have “contributed to processes that have
not been fair to all parties involved, that have lacked appropriate procedural protections, and that
have undermined confidence in the reliability of the outcomes of investigations of sexual
harassment allegations.” 135 Yet the Department’s guidance has been in place for at least twenty
years. Any lack of clarity has been the Department’s own creation, produced by its revocation of
long-standing guidance without a good reason, and a pretextual reason is not a legally sufficient
reason.
Respectfully, upending twenty years of guidance in the manner proposed will not provide
more clarity; rather, it will dilute Title IX’s effectiveness in addressing the perniciousness of
sexual violence on campuses. We believe that New York State’s Education Law Art. 129-B’s
statutory framework does provide clear guidance, all while protecting the rights of the parties
involved and without sacrificing Title IX’s purpose of remedying and preventing sexual violence
on campuses.
E. The Proposed Regulations Implicate Significant First Amendment Academic
Freedom Issues
Even as the Proposed Regulations direct that “[n]othing in this part requires a recipient
to: (1) Restrict any rights that would otherwise be protected from government action by the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,”136 the Proposed Regulations violate the First Amendment
rights of academic institutions. Traditionally, it is the provenance of educational institutions, and
especially public institutions which enjoy the sovereignty of their state, to determine for
themselves “on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study.” 137 Elemental to the right of deciding who may be admitted
to study is determining who, and under what conditions, someone can continue to study.
Colleges and universities, and especially state colleges and universities, thus have a duty
to investigate violations of their policies (both academic and non-academic), conduct a fair
process to determine responsibility, and sanction, where warranted, in a way that both educates
the student as to the consequences of their actions and deters further similar deleterious activity.
We can find no case that says the First Amendment or other Constitutional rights automatically
134
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give way just because the action by the federal government is declared to be under the Spending
Clause. The due process elements of the Proposed Regulations abrogate the rights of colleges
and universities to determine their process at a local level, in a shared governance approach with
the communities they serve, by setting detailed, costly processes, beyond those required by
courts or statute, before the institution can determine whether someone credibly accused of
harassing or assaulting another member of the institution’s community can be sanctioned or
limited in their ability to continue harassing or assaulting the Reporting Individual or other
community members. This infringes upon the institution’s academic freedom rights under the
First Amendment to the Constitution.
Institutions have an interest, protected by the First Amendment, in determining that
process and developing that policy. These Proposed Regulations would diminish that interest. It
is hard to determine if, in consideration of all the other issues raised in this letter, the Department
would be able to survive a strict scrutiny analysis and show that, in depriving public and private
institutions of what would otherwise be their First Amendment right, to determine a process that
serves their interests and needs at the local level, the Department’s regulations were addressing a
compelling governmental interest and were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. It is
especially difficult to make this showing inasmuch as the prior system has existed for more than
four-and-a-half decades without infringing on academic freedom.
Further, since the Department has stated that it “does not believe it is reasonable to
assume that these Proposed Regulations will have a quantifiable effect on the underlying rate of
sexual harassment occurring in the education programs or activities of” educational
institutions,138 it is not even clear what the compelling governmental interest is that the
Department would be addressing in the first place. Again, due process rights for Respondents,
without some showing of unequal treatment or disparate impact on the basis of sex, is not even
within the jurisdiction of the Department under this specific civil rights law, and so could hardly
be called a compelling governmental interest. If it is, the Department could ask Congress to
change the law or enact a new law, amend the Constitution, or otherwise take action in a manner
that does not infringe on the First Amendment rights of institutions. But the Department may not
use the regulatory process to infringe upon the First Amendment rights of institutions recognized
under Supreme Court precedent.
F. The Proposed Regulations Violate Basic Principles of Federalism
One of the largest oversights of these Proposed Regulations is the Department’s lack of
recognition that many states have considered legislation related to sexual assault since 2014. 139
In 2015, nearly a quarter of U.S. states passed legislation on this topic, and legislators in other
states created committees to examine this issue and make policy recommendations. 140 The lack
of consideration of state laws regarding campus sexual assault will create problems not only for
New York, but for a host of other states that have been active in legislating in this area. Many of
138
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these state laws incorporate federal statute, regulations and previous guidance as the “floor” and
then regulate beyond what is required on the federal level to ensure increased due process
protection for both Reporting Individuals and Respondents.
i. Federalism and State Impacts on New York’s Administrative Law
SUNY opposes the Proposed Regulations because they interfere with New York State’s
obligation under New York Education Law Article 129-B to provide for a safe campus
environment for New York’s students and fairly adjudicate violations of conduct on college
campuses. Although the Department states, without evidence, that “[w]e also have determined
that this regulatory action does not unduly interfere with State, local, or tribal governments in the
exercise of their governmental functions,” 141 for the reasons outlined in this letter, these
Proposed Regulations violate the principle of federalism, the sovereignty of the State of New
York, and are inconsistent with existing New York State law.
The Tenth Amendment states that powers not expressly granted to the federal
government must remain with the sovereign state. Issues of state law preemption and preemption
of the rulings of a state’s highest court must be considered when a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking is issued.
Even though multiple states in the country have laws addressing this overall issue,
nothing in the Proposed Regulations has acknowledged that fact. It is one of grave importance
when the Department’s Proposed Regulations make wholesale changes to the nature of campus
conduct hearings. While the proposed definition of “sexual harassment” is broader than what is
defined in New York State’s Education Law, it encompasses specific conduct addressed in New
York State law.
The Proposed Regulations define “sexual harassment” as:
(i) An employee of the recipient conditioning the provision of an aid, benefit, or
service of the recipient on an individual’s participation in unwelcome sexual
conduct;
(ii) Unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the
recipient’s education program or activity; or
(iii) Sexual assault, as defined in 34 CFR 668.46(a). 142
Sexual harassment as defined in the Proposed Regulations squarely captures certain areas now
regulated by New York State law, including sexual assault, and significantly changes the nature
of campus hearings in regard to due process in a way that runs counter to New York State’s
public policy and could cause significant conflicts with New York’s own law.
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Specifically, the Proposed Regulations will cause issues in regard to hearsay statements
as used in administrative proceedings in New York. The final ruling of Matter of Haug v. State
Univ. Of N.Y. at Potsdam, 143 which was taken up by the New York Court of Appeals in late
2018, held that hearsay evidence and Haug’s own testimony constituted substantial evidence to
support the University’s determination. 144 Similarly, the Second Circuit recently affirmed in Doe
v. Colgate University (2019), a private college case, that a university’s sexual misconduct
hearing did not violate Title IX when it considered hearsay evidence and did not permit the
Respondent to directly cross-examine the Reporting Individuals. 145
Hearsay statements are commonly used in administrative proceedings in New York. 146
New York’s highest court, the New York State Court of Appeals, has stated in numerous cases,
including Haug: “[h]earsay evidence is admissible as competent evidence in an administrative
proceeding, and if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence even if
contradicted by live testimony on credibility grounds.” 147 This is not the first time the Court of
Appeals has ruled on this issue in general, but it was the first time the high court has taken up
this issue regarding CPLR Article 78 148 proceedings challenging a formal hearing on a college
campus in New York for sexual misconduct. The facts here demonstrate exactly why hearsay
was an important, probative component of this specific type of hearing. The Reporting Individual
did not testify, but the police officer who took the Reporting Individual’s statement did, and
written notes prepared by the Director of Student Conduct and Community Standards were also
considered. 149 In Haug, the Petitioner (Respondent below) testified at the hearing, and the Court
stated: “[t]he hearing board also could have reasonably interpreted some of petitioner’s behavior
as consciousness of guilt and concluded that his version of the events was not credible.” 150 The
Court further stated that, “[u]ltimately, it was the province of the hearing board to resolve any
conflicts in the evidence and make credibility determinations.” 151 As a matter of process, New
York has an entire structure for any administrative proceedings to ensure that due process rights
are not violated. Considering the myriad of agencies and different types of administrative
hearings that exist, it is no surprise that New York’s courts have ruled on some of the issues that
go to the heart of the Proposed Regulations.
The lack of a requirement for cross-examination during administrative proceedings goes
directly to the heart of New York Education Law Article 129-B (Article 129-B) as well. 152
Article 129-B affords this discretion and is integral to the law because it allows the Reporting
Individual to decide not to participate in the disciplinary process, but still allows an institution to
go forward in the event they want to pursue these allegations. New York’s law is structured in
143
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such a way that the institution is responsible for investigating and adjudicating any claims of
misconduct. 153 This was true even before the enactment of Article 129-B and is now an essential
part of the Students’ Bill of Rights provisions. 154 To ignore what is current principle and process
on cross-examination in administrative proceedings in not just New York, but also the Second
Circuit, would then create significant issues going forward for college campuses in New York.
Specifically, Jacobson v. Blaise, an Appellate Division case, directly addressed the issue
of cross examination in live hearings relating to sexual misconduct. 155 The court “reject[ed the]
petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process because he was not permitted to cross-examine
an adverse witness in an administrative proceeding.” 156 Further, the Second Circuit has stated,
“[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses generally has not been considered an essential
requirement of due process in school disciplinary proceedings.” 157 The Department’s Proposed
Regulations will cause undue disruption of settled case law and statute in New York, and goes
against well-settled administrative law principles that govern administrative proceedings.
New York’s laws and the rulings by New York’s highest court are embedded with New
York’s fundamental policies and beliefs as a state, and preempt the Proposed Regulations by the
Department. The Proposed Regulations violate the principles of federalism.
ii. How Sebelius Informs the Nature of Federalism
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.” 158 As recently as 2012, the United States Supreme Court has
ruled on the limited powers of the federal government and the importance of state police
powers. 159 While Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius deals with the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), it is instructive on how the U.S. Supreme Court has now treated
federal laws and regulations and how they abridge the states’ police powers going forward.
The majority opinion in Sebelius clarifies that Congress’ power under the Spending
Clause has great latitude, including allowing grants to be conditioned upon “taking certain
actions Congress could not require [states] to take.” 160 However, the Court made it clear there
are “recognized limits [ ] to secure state compliance with federal objectives.” 161 The Court has
“repeatedly characterized” legislation and regulation reliant on the Spending Clause as
contractual in nature between the states and the federal government. 162 When the federal
153
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government exercises spending power, it hinges upon “the State voluntarily and knowingly
accept[ing] the terms of the ‘contract.’” 163 Essentially, when the federal government uses
“financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue influence,’” it is a violation of the
principles set forth in the Tenth Amendment. 164 This concept has been supported in past
decisions by the Supreme Court in New York v. U.S. and Printz v. U.S. 165 The Court has long
stated that federal programs do not hold the same type of danger when the state has a “legitimate
choice whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for the federal funds.” 166
In Sebelius, the PPACA was written so that if a state did not implement the new
substantial expansion of Medicaid, the state would lose all Medicaid funding going forward.
That would include both federal dollars for the existing Medicaid program, and any funding for
the Medicaid expansion. 167 Essentially, the Court stated that federal funding for Medicaid made
up such substantial portions of current state budgets that changing the program in this fashion
through this legislation constituted a new program, and as such, revoking all funds from the
existing program on top of any new funds constituted an essential overreach in Spending Clause
powers. 168 The Court was very clear by stating: “[w]hen… such conditions take the form of
threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.” 169
Here, the Department has substantially altered the nature of Title IX through these
Proposed Regulations so that it would create an entirely new process for campus hearings in
relation to sexual harassment and sexual assault. A parallel argument can be made to Sebelius
that if these Proposed Regulations were implemented and a state did not come into compliance, it
would lose a significant portion of its state budget provided through federal education funding.
Many of the funds a state would stand to lose are independent grants, including a loss of all
federal financial aid funds. Sebelius does also address blanket warnings about future loss of
federal funding for noncompliance in statute. 170 Essentially, the Court has stated that there can be
a blanket warning, however, a state cannot anticipate alterations that “transform [something] so
dramatically.” 171 For many reasons stated above, the Proposed Regulations are a significant
departure from all guidance, statutes and regulation that have come before it, and, as such, no
state would have any advance warning or knowledge from the past 45 years of accepting federal
funds for education. This would constitute a significant overreach with no clear precedent in the
actual text of Title IX itself and would allow the Department to withhold federal funding from
states that do not comply if these regulations are implemented. For these foregoing reasons,
SUNY requests that the Proposed Regulations be withdrawn.
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iii. The Conduct Regulated by the Department Falls Directly Within New
York State’s Police Powers
A recognized principle of state sovereignty is the acknowledgement of what qualifies as a
state police power. State police powers have historically been broad. Case law refers to this as a
“general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Government.” 172
State police power does not need constitutional authorization, as it occupies the space where the
federal government has no authority to govern, and ensures that issues “touch[ing] on citizens’
daily lives” are addressed “by smaller governments closer to the governed.” 173 This includes
issues such as “punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for
development,” however, that list is not exhaustive.174 Even if the federal government does not
have express authorization through the Constitution to govern certain issues, any state
government action is still subject to constitutional principles, including due process and equal
protection. 175
SUNY is a public state entity providing education, thus, it falls squarely within New
York’s police powers to regulate it. Further, in 2015, New York passed the most comprehensive
law in the country governing campus conduct processes in relation to sexual assault, dating
violence, domestic violence, and stalking. 176 Article 129-B of the New York State Education
Law put into place a balanced procedure for receiving, investigating and adjudicating disclosures
by Reporting Individuals in relation to that specific conduct. Article 129-B creates uniform
procedures for handling these types of reports on college and university campuses in New
York. 177 As early as 2014, New York’s upper chamber held a roundtable discussion about best
practices for any hearings conducted by campuses in relation to sexual assault and released a
report on this issue in relation to how it affected New York students. 178 New York’s Governor
and both houses of New York’s Legislature engaged in extensive negotiations before the final
passage of the legislation and its signature into law. 179
New York’s laws in this specific area are well within its state police powers. The federal
government has set the floor on this issue in the past with the passage of the VAWA
172
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Amendments to the Clery Act, and New York’s law incorporates the due process strictures
required in the Final Rule promulgated pursuant to the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery
Act. 180 New York’s law has features that are not discussed in either guidance or federal law, such
as transcript notations. 181 The Proposed Regulations, if enacted, threaten to disturb not just New
York’s laws, but also that of many other states. Further, it significantly disrupts settled law in
New York and at least one provision runs in direct contravention to case law settled in the New
York State Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court. 182
In Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, a student commenced a CPLR
Article 78 proceeding against SUNY Potsdam, challenging his expulsion after a finding of
responsibility. 183 The original decision saw Haug suspended, and when Haug challenged the
decision with an appeal, the school revised its decision and expelled Haug. 184 The Court of
Appeals took up the case specifically on the issue regarding whether hearsay evidence, along
with the petitioner’s own testimony at the administrative hearing, was enough to provide
substantial evidence to support SUNY Potsdam’s determination. 185 The Proposed Regulations as
a whole are troubling because specific sections of it directly contradict New York State’s
administrative procedures. This again goes back to how important it is for the federal
government to recognize that state sovereignty must be respected, especially in relation to these
specific processes. The Federal government’s goal in regulating this area has never gone so far as
to invalidate such procedures in this arena, and if these Proposed Regulations go into effect, it
will render part of New York’s considered approach to these issues less effective. For these
reasons, the Proposed Regulations should be withdrawn.
iv. Inconsistency with New York State Law
SUNY further opposes the Proposed Regulations because of the inconsistencies it creates
with New York State law. One distinction between New York Education Law Article 129-B and
the Proposed Regulations is that the Department would only allow parties to exclude past sexual
history while Article 129-B allows parties to exclude both past sexual history and past mental
health history to protect Reporting Individuals and Respondents alike in the conduct process. 186
SUNY also has concerns with how protective and supportive measures are described by
the Department in the Proposed Regulations. Previously, in the 2016 Clery Act Handbook,
Department guidance stated:
[p]rotective measures should minimize the burden on the victim. For example, if
the complainant and alleged perpetrator share the same class or residence hall, the
school should not, as a matter of course, remove the victim from the class or
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housing while allowing the alleged perpetrator to remain without carefully
considering the facts of the case. 187
Supportive measures are considered non-disciplinary and non-punitive. Once a complaint
is lodged against a student, if one student’s housing or academic schedule must change to
maintain a status quo, colleges generally move the accused student. Education Law Article 129B requires that if there is a no contact order in place, if both parties arrive simultaneously to a
location, the Respondent must leave. 188 This now raises a series of questions that may cause New
York colleges to have compliance challenges. The Department is unclear on whether these
supportive measures are now considered disciplinary in nature, and whether this would constitute
an “unreasonable burden.” 189 At this point, the Proposed Regulations do not lend any clarity to
what this means and do not define this in plain terms for recipients to follow. This could cause
confusion for states, and lead to onerous and expensive litigation.
In sum, the Department has offered no rationale for why it upends its own long-standing
guidance, including policies and sub-regulatory guidance enacted following a notice-andcomment period, severely impacting the reliance interests of millions of students, faculty, and
staff at the nation’s school districts, colleges, and universities. Moreover, these proposals are
inconsistent with the procedural due process minimums and balances already established by
superior authorities—Congress, through the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) and the United States Supreme Court—for recipient institutions handling
cases of sexual harassment and sexual violence. They offend the Tenth Amendment right of
States, including New York, to set forth standards of due process applicable to administrative
proceedings, and they erode the First Amendment rights of colleges and universities without
serving a compelling government interest. Our hope is that the Department is not so singleminded in its pursuit of the Proposed Regulations that it cannot accommodate SUNY’s concerns,
and the concerns of thousands of other writers submitting comments. The Department must fully
consider all of these comments and address the undeniable imbalance promised by the Proposed
Regulations.
II.

Issues With Specific Sections of the Proposed Regulations

In this part of its comments, SUNY discusses its issues with specific sections of the
Department’s Proposed Regulations. Section A describes issues with the § 106.30 definitions.
Section B describes issues with § 106.44, which describes how recipients should respond to
sexual harassment allegations. Section C describes issues with § 106.45, which relates to
grievance procedures for formal complaints of sexual harassment. Section D contains answers to
the Department’s directed questions.
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A. § 106.30 – Definitions - Sexual Harassment
Section A describes SUNY’s specific issues with the Department’s definition of “sexual
harassment” as it narrows the Department’s administrative enforcement of Title IX with its
definition in the Proposed Regulations, and also contains inconsistencies with the 2013 VAWA
amendments to the Clery Act.
Department Narrows Administrative Enforcement of Title IX through Its New Definition
of “Sexual Harassment”
The Department’s Proposed Regulations would change its approach to administrative
enforcement of Title IX in a way that is far narrower than the plain language of the statute. The
Proposed Regulations define “sexual harassment” as, among other things, “unwelcome conduct
on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies
a person equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity.” 190 While this provision
mirrors the statutory language of “excluded from participation,” it forgets the other two
provisions, which state that no person should be “denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination” in educational programs or activities. 191 While SUNY understands and agrees
with the Supreme Court’s higher standards for receipt of money judgments, we find it very
surprising that the Department would reduce its administrative authority in this area in this way.
Across the country, sexual harassment and assault can deny people the benefits of
education, even if it does not exclude them from education. If Congress meant “deny benefits” to
be as narrow as “exclude,” it would not have bothered repeating the phrase. A plain
interpretation, consistent with statutory interpretation standards, states that a legislative body
does not use words accidentally or without meaning. Therefore, a plain interpretation is that a
lower level of denial of benefits could violate Title IX. This likely does not mean that a very
minor limitation would meet the standard. But by affirmatively declining any authority to even
investigate whether the actions of an employee or other student in a K-12 or higher education
institution denies a person or persons “the benefits of” education on the basis of sex, the
Department firmly closes the door on investigating a prong that Congress included in the statute.
Further, it is possible to be the victim of discrimination without being fully denied access. Again,
by regulating away any authority to even investigate such cases, the Department denies itself the
ability to effectuate the will of Congress or to even attempt to effectuate that will. We believe
this is an error of interpretation and urge the Department to return to its long-held approach to
investigating Title IX.
The 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act Show Congressional Intent and the
Department’s Definition Contradicts Congress’ Statements on this Issue
In defining sexual harassment to specifically include “sexual assault” as defined in the
2013 Violence Against Women Act amendments to the Clery Act, 192 the Proposed Regulations
create significant inconsistencies that could require colleges to make the Hobson’s choice of
190

Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61496 (emphasis added).
20 U.S.C. §1681.
192
34 CFR 668.46(a).
191

Page 42 of 82
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/44
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1838

42

et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

risking funds and fines by acting in a way that is inconsistent with the Higher Education Act or
risking funds (and having determinations of responsibility for violations—but not determinations
of non-responsibility—overturned by OCR staff) by acting in a way that is inconsistent with
Title IX regulations. While the greatest impact will be in higher education, we will note that
some traditional K-12 institutions accept Title IV funds for certain post-baccalaureate career and
technical education and will likewise face this difficult and confusing choice.
These distinctions and inconsistencies are troubling since the Proposed Regulations
conflict with a statute passed by bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress, signed by the
President, and implemented after a successful Negotiated Rulemaking and opportunity for public
comment.
In the Final Rule implementing the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the
Clery Act, the Department heard from commenters who worried that the “Proposed Regulations
eliminate essential due process protections, and entrust unqualified campus employees and
students to safeguard the interests of the parties involved in adjudicating allegations.” 193 The
Department firmly disagreed, pointing out that the statute and the regulations developed pursuant
to the statute “require that: an institution’s disciplinary proceedings be fair, prompt, and impartial
to both the accused and the accuser; the proceedings provide the same opportunities to both
parties to have an advisor of their choice present; and the proceedings be conducted by officials
who receive training on sexual assault issues and on how to conduct a proceeding that protects
the safety of victims and promotes accountability. Thus, these procedures do provide significant
protections for all parties.” 194 The Department also made clear that the levels of due process
should be appropriate for these types of cases, writing that “[w]e also note that institutions are
not making determinations of criminal responsibility but are determining whether the
institution’s own rules have been violated.” 195 In the current Proposed Regulations, the
Department ignores this history to make changes that are inconsistent with, and may be seen as
an attempt to supersede, the VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act, inasmuch as both sets of
regulations would include actions defined in the VAWA Amendments as sexual assault.
B. § 106.44 – Recipient’s response to sexual harassment
Section B of this Part outlines SUNY’s specific concerns with parts of the Department’s
Proposed Regulations. Subsection (i) discusses SUNY’s concerns with the contradictions to
Clery Act geography, and the inconsistencies in relation to off campus programs. Subsection (ii)
discusses SUNY’s concerns with the Department’s new “safe harbor” provisions. Subsection (iii)
discusses SUNY’s concerns with mandated investigations in the instance of two or more
complainants and highlights the confidentiality issues associated with that provision. Subsection
(iv) discusses SUNY’s specific concerns with the Department’s proposed “emergency removal”
provision.
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i.

§106.44(a) Generally – Geography

SUNY takes specific issue with how the Department has treated geography in its
Proposed Regulations. It is in contradiction with the Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA
amendments to the Clery Act in relation to geography, and also causes significant problems
going forward in relation to Greek letter organizations.
The Department’s Proposed Regulations Ignore Congressional Intent of the 2013 VAWA
Amendments to the Clery Act Regarding Geography
The response requirements of the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act are not limited to
Clery Act geography. From the face of the Final Rule, they apply to the institution regardless of
whether the incident disclosed occurred on campus or off campus. The Final Rule requires that
higher education institutions have a policy statement explaining the process and procedure for
disclosures of sexual assault (and three other crimes) and the policy statement would apply
“whether the offense occurred on or off campus.” 196 In its 2016 Clery Handbook, the Department
clearly states and emphasizes that “[y]ou must follow the procedures described in your statement
(of response, investigation and adjudication policy) regardless of where the alleged case of
dating violence, domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking occurred (i.e., on or off your
institution’s Clery Act geography).” 197
The Department, even while defining sexual harassment to include, in part, sexual assault
as defined in the Clery Act, uses a very different standard of geographic jurisdiction. The
Department had traditionally required institutions to respond to harassment or violence that could
limit participation in educational programs or activities, wherever they occurred in the world, if
the covered institution was in the United States. Case law is split in determining whether the
provisions of Title IX would apply to activity that occurred outside of the United States. 198 In its
Proposed Regulations, the Department now states that “[t]he requirements that a recipient adopt
a policy and grievance procedures as described in this section apply only to exclusion from
participation, denial of benefits, or discrimination on the basis of sex occurring against a person
in the United States.” 199 In addition to being inconsistent with the Department’s own
interpretation of the VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act, another education law that is a mere
half-decade old, and being inconsistent with longstanding Department interpretation and
practice, this limitation will have real and significant impact on the access of some students to
their education.
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Based on the plain language of the Department’s Proposed Regulations, if 10 students of
an educational institution go on an institution-sponsored and run study abroad trip to fulfill a
requirement of their major at the institution, and the three female participants disclose that they
have been repeatedly raped, harassed and sexually assaulted by an institution-employed
chaperone (no male students report this experience), hired to attend this program and supervise
students, and due to the repeated harassment by an institution employee, those three students
leave the international program, thus derailing their ability to complete their major at their home
institution in the United States, and causing all three to drop out of their institution and incur
significant debt, if the institution takes no action, those students—whose access to education
at home and abroad was barred by the action aimed solely at females—would have
absolutely no recourse to OCR under Title IX, the law charged with prohibiting
restrictions of access to education on the basis of sex. We can see no policy reason to support
this change and believe that such a scenario is not impossible to imagine (indeed similar
scenarios have been reported on distance education trips). At best, we will see confusion in
Reporting Individuals between the requirements of Title IX, the Clery Act, and state laws such as
Education Law Article 129-B.
The Department’s Intent on Off Campus Programs Is Confusing and Inconsistent with the
Clery Act
The Department, in significantly limiting Title IX requirements to disclosures of
incidents that occur on campus or off campus on institution programs or activities includes some
language around Greek letter organization housing and other off campus activities. 200 In addition
to being inconsistent with the Clery Act response requirements as added by the 2013 VAWA
amendments, the standards are inconsistent with the Clery Act crime reporting definitions of On
Campus, Non-Campus and Public Property, 201 and will likely cause additional confusion as the
Department adds yet one more set of geographic demarcating rules.
Further, the Department’s discussion of Greek letter association housing will likely have
an impact on the relationship of some institutions to those organizations. Institutions that are
incentivized to reduce their obligations under Title IX (and we do not count the State University
of New York among this group), may be incentivized to reduce their oversight of such housing
so violations occurring there are not covered under these Proposed Regulations.
Under the prior OCR interpretations, institutions would be required to take action if
incidents disclosed there could limit access to education, regardless of the level of oversight of
the group. Further, under the Clery Act, analogous sexual assault crimes might be reported if
they occurred at Greek letter housing, but only, per the Department’s definition, if the house was
“owned or controlled by a student organization that is officially recognized.” 202 The limiting
factor here is that the deed or lease would have to be held by the organization, since the
Department also declares that “[p]rivate homes and businesses are not included.” 203 Therefore if
individual members of a recognized organization (Greek letter or otherwise) live in a house and
200
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they (or their parents) are on the deed or lease, it would not be considered non-campus property.
This definition is inconsistent with the Department’s new regime based on a reading of selected
case law that could indicate whether a recognized student organization’s house would or would
not be considered to be a program or activity under these new Title IX standards. At best, this is
confusing and inconsistent with longstanding Clery Act geographic definitions. At worst, it
would incentivize some institutions to either no longer recognize Greek letter associations, or
reduce their recognition so that it would not meet the tests drawn from the selected cases in the
Proposed Regulations. 204 But there are very good reasons for the Department to incentivize such
relationships. Recognition can come with requirements such as mandatory insurance, risk
management standards and, most importantly, training requirements. Not only could such
training requirements reduce the incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault, 205 but it
could also reduce the incidents of hazing, educate about the safe use of alcohol, assist in suicide
reduction, and other important topics. Disincentivizing engagement with these student
populations, even slightly, may lead some institutions to forego these beneficial educational
programs, increasing risks for certain students.
ii. §106.44 (a) and (b) – “Safe Harbor”
SUNY has significant concerns with the “safe harbor” provision the Department has
included in its Proposed Regulations. The Proposed Regulations create a significant imbalance in
rights for Reporting Individuals and Respondents, and do not follow the spirit of Title IX. In
truth, the Proposed Regulations provide a “partial” safe harbor—safe harbor from accusations of
Title IX violations made by Reporting Individuals but elevated exposure to Title IX violation
accusations made by Respondents.
The Safe Harbor Provisions Provide Only Partial Safe Harbor, Elevating Rights of
Respondents over Those Traditionally Protected By Title IX
In its Proposed Regulations, the Department writes that institutions will not be found to
be deliberately indifferent and, thus, out of compliance with Title IX in responding to complaints
unless their actions are “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances” 206 and the
“Assistant Secretary will not deem a recipient’s determination regarding responsibility to be
evidence of deliberate indifference by the recipient merely because the Assistant Secretary would
have reached a different determination based on an independent weighing of the evidence.” 207
The Department separately refers to this as a “safe harbor.” 208 But the Department only seeks to
shield institutions from liability from failing those who directly experience sexual harassment or
sexual violence. These are, to be clear, the people that Title IX was written to protect.

204

Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61468.
For a particularly useful example, see Binghamton University: State University of New York, 20:1 Sexual
Assault Prevention; 20:1 Bystander Intervention, available at https://www.binghamton.edu/hpps/students/peereducation/index.html.
206
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497.
207
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497.
208
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61469.
205

Page 46 of 82
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/44
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1838

46

et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

In considering the incredibly detailed due process requirements imposed by the
Department on public and private institutions of education, requirements that are, in total, far
beyond what any statute or court case in any jurisdiction have ever required of a disciplinary
process, the Department invades upon the measured and considered due process and policy
balance that public and private institutions carefully apply to their policies and practices, and
wholesale replaces local control with a top down one-size-fits-all set of standards issued from
what the Secretary of Education called “the heavy hand of Washington.” 209 The Department
admits in the preamble that these due process requirements go beyond what case law would
require of institutions. 210 As the Secretary of Education once criticized, this is an example of “the
Department insist[ing] it knew better than those who walk side-by-side with students every
day.” 211 The Department in its Preamble, at least in terms of reducing liability for failing to serve
a Reporting Individual, writes that it believes the narrowed standard of obligation
…holds recipients accountable without depriving them of legitimate and
necessary flexibility to make disciplinary decisions and to provide supportive
measures that might be necessary in response to sexual harassment. Moreover, the
Department believes that teachers and local school leaders with unique knowledge
of the school culture and student body are best positioned to make disciplinary
decisions; thus, unless the recipient’s response to sexual harassment is clearly
unreasonable in light of known circumstances, the Department will not second
guess such decisions. In fact, the Court observed in Davis that courts must not
second guess recipients’ disciplinary decisions. As a matter of policy, the
Department believes that it would be equally wrong for it to second guess
recipients’ disciplinary decisions through the administrative enforcement
process. 212
Later, the Department insists that its “intent is to balance the need to establish procedural
safeguards providing a fair process for all parties with recognition that a recipient needs
flexibility to employ grievance procedures that work best for the recipient’s educational
environment.” 213 SUNY again appreciates the Department’s acknowledgement of the expertise
that exists on our campuses and in our states for how to address harassment and violence in a
balanced, thoughtful manner.
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So it is curious that, while the Department offers safe harbor from a Title IX violation
finding for failing to serve a Reporting Individual, it specifically disclaims any safe harbor for
failing to follow the detailed due process obligations the Department would impose upon
institutions. The Department calls for institutional policies to have the “basic requirement” to
“treat complainants and Respondents equitably.” 214 The Department admits that “OCR’s role is
not to conduct a de novo review of the recipient’s investigation and determination of
responsibility for a particular Respondent. Rather, OCR’s role is to determine whether a recipient
has complied with Title IX and its implementing regulations.” 215 To that end, with local control
and minimal impact as its goal, the Department states that “OCR will not find a recipient to have
violated Title IX or this part solely because OCR may have weighed the evidence differently in a
given case. The Department believes it is important to include this provision in the regulations to
provide notice and transparency to recipients about OCR’s role and standard of review in
enforcing Title IX.” 216
But even as it calls for institutions to treat Reporting Individuals and Respondents
equitably as a basic part of their own procedures, OCR will only provide such local control and a
light bureaucratic touch in cases where a Respondent has been found not responsible. Incredibly,
on the same page as these adulatory statements of flexibility and local control of the process by
institutions that are closest to the students, the Department firmly states that “[t[his provision
does not, however, preclude OCR from requiring a recipient’s determination of responsibility to
be set aside if the recipient did not comply with proposed § 106.45.” 217 No standards are set for
such an invasive overturning of a determination made by an institution after going through its
process. Ostensibly, OCR could find a minor violation of the detailed due process requirements
of the regulations and reverse a finding of responsibility. Yet even with a finding of gross or
even malicious violations that lead to a non-responsibility finding, an OCR investigator would be
powerless to do anything aside from closing the file and moving on.
This inequitable and unbalanced process will certainly lead to more administrative
litigation filed by Respondents. What attorney for a Respondent found responsible after a hearing
would not file with OCR on the off chance that they can point out a major or minor process
violation and have an OCR attorney in Washington or their region completely reverse the finding
against their client? In filing, the only possibilities are that nothing will happen or their case will
be overturned on this new OCR appeal, meaning their client will be considered not responsible,
regardless of institutional policy, practices, and the weight of the evidence at the institution level.
Frankly, it might be ineffective assistance of counsel not to make such a filing inasmuch as it is
free, does not meet the current vexatious standards of the Case Processing Manual and could
only have positive results for their Respondent client. OCR could become, in effect, one more
level of appeal for Respondents (and only Respondents) hoping to have a determination of
responsibility overturned.
Like many aspects of these Proposed Regulations, such a one-sided application has no
support in statute. But more so, it is hard to imagine the framers of Title IX hoping that OCR’s
214
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role would be reduced to closing cases of harassment and assault filed by Reporting Individuals
who directly experienced that harm and believed their access to education was limited or denied,
while serving as a free appeals board for Respondents so credibly accused that they were found
responsible by neutral hearing officers after an institutional process.
iii. §106.44(b)(2) – Multiple Complainants/Confidentiality
SUNY is concerned about the Proposed Regulations’ mandate to always investigate
multiple complainants against the same individual—not because of the requirement to
investigate, but because of the impact of other provisions on such a requirement—and wishes to
raise some of the issues this new requirement will cause with confidentiality to Reporting
Individuals (we later detail harm these provisions will cause to Respondents).
Harm to Reporting Individuals in the Department’s Proposed Regulations Regarding
Confidentiality and Reversal of Course on Previous Guidance
SUNY opposes the Proposed Regulations on the basis that they harm Reporting
Individuals by not following previous precedent in regard to confidentiality. In 2014, the
Department called on institutions to protect the confidentiality of Reporting Individuals, “even if
the victim does not specifically request confidentiality.” 218 The Department adopted the 2013
VAWA amendment to the Clery Act confidentiality provisions, which also govern cases of
sexual assault, and which include name and contact information. 219 The issue here is that the
Department has changed course in these Proposed Regulations, and now expects recipients to
release the names of Reporting Individuals to a Respondent in the notice process if the Reporting
Individual participates or if there are two or more disclosures and the Title IX Coordinator is
obligated to commence the process, even if both individuals decline to be involved in an
investigation. 220 This could cause significant issues in the case where one individual is the
subject of multiple complaints and a Title IX coordinator does not have enough information to
open an investigation. It would mean that individuals who do not want to be involved would then
have their names revealed in the notice, but if they still do not participate, will likely see a
finding of non-responsibility against the Respondent which could then nullify any future
involvement by the individuals if more reporters come forward later. This would certainly chill
reporting and cause significant problems for investigations at recipient schools going forward.
Unfortunately, higher education and K-12 have seen their share of serial violators, both
among students and employees. If two Reporting Individuals disclose assault or harassment by
the same person but decline to participate in any way, the Title IX Coordinator would be
obligated to start an investigation, reveal the identities of the two Reporting Individuals to the
Accused (now a Respondent) in the notice, and then, if they still refuse to participate, ultimately
find the Accused/Respondent not responsible. Under public college due process obligations, it
would be very hard if not impossible to then use these first two disclosures in the investigation
and adjudication of reports three and four. If those Reporting Individuals in turn do not
participate, the Respondent will have another “get out of jail free” card and be free to offend
218
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again and again until someone is willing to testify and be subject to cross-examination. For
offenders who target vulnerable populations—children; immigrants; those dependents upon the
harasser for employment, scholarship funds or work study or a letter of recommendation in their
chosen field; individuals with disabilities; transgender and gender non-binary—the likelihood of
willingness to stand for cross-examination is reduced significantly. The offender will be free to
continue and the institution would be powerless under processes subject to these Proposed
Regulations, even as, in cases of sexual assault, the Proposed Regulations would require
institutions to ignore the confidentiality provisions of VAWA and New York State law.
For the foregoing reason, SUNY requests the Proposed Regulations be withdrawn due to
the harm it will cause students and institutions attempting to investigate multiple complaints
against one individual.
iv. §106.44(c) - Emergency Removal
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations that dictate a new process for
emergency removal on the basis that it does not actually track the Clery Act language as the
Department claims, would inadvertently cause due process violations with the way the
provisions are currently written, and would cause SUNY to potentially violate New York State
law.
The Department’s Emergency Removal Provision Lacks Crucial Context
Under proposed section 106.44(c), recipients would have the authority to conduct an
“emergency removal” of Respondents based on an individualized threat assessment, provided
that the Respondent had the opportunity to challenge the decision “immediately following the
removal.” While the Department writes that this language tracks the Clery Act regulations at 34
CFR 668.46(g), the corresponding Clery Act provision says nothing about the process owed to
Respondents subject to an interim suspension. Courts hold that the due process required under an
interim suspension is less elaborate than necessary during a full hearing. 221 In turn, New York
Education Law Article 129-B provides a detailed framework by which campus officials may
conduct an individualized threat assessment, order an interim suspension, and provide due
process to the Respondent.
The Proposed Regulations, however, harbor a clear ambiguity in requiring an opportunity
to challenge the suspension “immediately” following the removal. It is unclear if the
“immediate” challenge must occur minutes, hours, one day, or several days after the suspension.
A requirement that the challenge occur minutes after the suspension (a plain language
interpretation of “immediately”) could jeopardize the safety of the Reporting Individual and the
community, since the very point of an interim suspension is to remove a known risk from
campus. Conversely, requiring an immediate hearing could undermine the Respondent’s due
process rights, because the Respondent might not be physically present on campus when the
interim suspension is issued. This ambiguity will subject recipients to potential litigation by both
Reporting Individuals and Respondents, seeking to parse the definition of “immediate,” with no
corresponding benefit.
221
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C. § 106.45 – Grievance procedures for formal complaints of sexual harassment
Section C of this part of the comment letter outlines SUNY’s specific concerns with §
106.45 of the Department’s Proposed Regulations. Subsection (i) outlines issues with the lack of
definition of “bias.” Subsection (ii) outlines issues with lack of clarity on the phrase “delay
caused solely by administrative needs.” Subsection (iii) outlines issues with the Department’s
changes in what standard of evidence may be used to determine responsibility and specifically
raises that the Department’s current Proposed Regulations are in direct contravention to
Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act. Subsection (iv) outlines
specific issues with the notice of allegations, including the ambiguities created with no definition
of “sufficient time,” and the issue that the notice the Department is requiring through the
Proposed Regulations is more detailed than notice given in criminal adjudications. Subsection
(v) discusses the confusion caused by the differences in approach between K-12 and higher
education. Subsection (vi) outlines SUNY’s issues regarding cross-examination and advisor of
choice, including that this will completely eliminate any cost-savings the Department claims.
Subsection (vii) outlines issues related to allowing access to evidence that is not relevant.
Subsection (viii) outlines issues related to the investigative report requirements that the
Department has mandated. Subsection (ix) discusses SUNY’s concerns with the Department’s
appeals provision in the Proposed Regulations.
i. §106.45(b)(1)(iii) – No conflicts of interest or bias of coordinators,
investigators and decision makers
Lack of Definition of “Bias” by the Department Will Cause Confusion
Proposed section 106.45(b)(1)(iii) would prohibit “any individual designated by a
recipient as a coordinator, investigator, or decision-maker” from having a bias or conflict of
interest for or against Reporting Individuals or Respondents. This proposal is similar, albeit
broader in scope, to the Department’s regulations enacting the 2013 VAWA Amendments to the
Clery Act mandating that “proceedings” be “[c]onducted by officials who do not have a conflict
of interest or bias for or against the accuser or the accused.” 222
Without a clearer definition of “conflict of interest” or “bias,” and in light of the other
confusing and conflicting aspects of these Proposed Regulations, institutions will have difficulty
implementing this mandate. After all, the Proposed Regulations suggest a reversal of the judicial
presumption that campus decision-makers are free of bias. To overcome this presumption in Title
IX litigation, courts require proof that a conduct official had an “actual” bias against the party
because of the party’s sex, and that the discriminatory actions flowed from that actual sex-based
bias. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, “[t]he presumption is a rebuttable one, but
the burden of rebuttal is heavy indeed: To carry that burden, the party claiming bias must lay a
specific foundation of prejudice or prejudgment, such that the probability of actual bias is too
high to be constitutionally tolerable.” 223
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The Proposed Regulations open the door to numerous claims that undermine the
presumption of honesty in campus proceedings. For example, litigants in Title IX cases
commonly argue that campus disciplinary officials were biased or conflicted because of their
research agenda or record of pro-victim advocacy. Yet the Department has previously indicated
that a party could not support a claim of “bias” under Section 668.46(k)(3)(i) of VAWA based
on the bare allegation that “ideologically inspired people dominate the pool of available
participants” in a proceeding arising from sexual misconduct. 224 Federal courts of appeal,
including the Sixth Circuit, likewise agree that “being a feminist, being affiliated with a genderstudies program, or researching sexual assault does not support a reasonable inference than an
individual is biased against men.” 225 The present proposal offers no clarity on whether the
Department would brook such frivolous claims.
The plain text of the Proposed Regulations also does not illuminate whether the
Department will consider an official’s holding of two or more roles in the conduct process to be
per se proof of bias or conflict of interest. Small community colleges, in particular, have limited
staff resources to investigate and adjudicate incidents of campus sexual harassment and violence.
If the Department intends to prohibit any overlap in responsibilities among the “coordinator,
investigator, or decision-maker,” it must make that intention clear. Such a rule would provide
due process protections exceeding those required by federal and state courts, including the Sixth
Circuit. 226 Courts have held that a decision-maker’s being part of the initial investigation of the
incident and the initiation of the conduct proceeding is not, in and of itself, proof of bias. 227
Declaring the holding of dual roles as a per se due process violation will strain already limited
resources, even as courts have condoned the practice absent clear evidence of “actual” bias.
Finally, these Proposed Regulations cloud efforts to bring trauma-informed practice to
campus disciplinary proceedings. To address the neurobiological impact of trauma on Reporting
Individuals’ memories, many colleges and universities now require conduct officials to obtain
training in trauma-informed practice. The VAWA amendments to the Clery Act require officials
to be trained annually and several states, including New York, California, and Illinois, mandate
trauma-informed training for campus officials who respond to sexual assault. 228 Title IX litigants
have claimed that trauma-informed practice constitutes a form of sex discrimination in favor of
Reporting Individuals. 229 Courts generally reject this argument, but the Department’s lack of
clarity promises further litigation in the future. 230
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ii. §106.45(b)(1)(v) – Reasonably prompt timeframes for conclusion of
process
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations specifically because of the
language around delays caused solely by administrative needs. SUNY can demonstrate multiple
situations in which this would be unworkable and untenable.
The Department’s Lack of Clarity on “Delay Caused Solely by Administrative Needs”
Causes Significant Issues in Interpretation for Recipients
According to proposed section 106.45(b)(1)(v), the Department recognizes that grievance
procedures need only provide “reasonably prompt timeframes” and may allow for temporary
delays and delays based on “good cause.” While we agree that some flexibility is necessary, we
are confused by the Department’s contradictory interpretation of the Proposed Regulations as
meaning that “delays caused solely by administrative needs are insufficient to satisfy this
standard.” 231 The Department must further clarify what “administrative needs” would not
constitute good cause for delay.
For example, it is not uncommon for a SUNY campus in New York’s “Snow Belt” to
delay or cancel classes because of dangerous winter weather. Under that circumstance, parties,
witnesses, and disciplinary officials could not be expected to attend a scheduled meeting or
hearing in the proceeding. Yet the Proposed Regulations would offer grounds for a party to claim
a due process violation based on a recipient’s “administrative needs” decision to delay a hearing
to protect the safety of its students and staff.
iii. §106.45(b)(1)(vii) – Standard of evidence described to determine
responsibility
SUNY takes issue with the constraints the Department has put around the use of
preponderance of the evidence because it reverses course from the Congressional intent of the
2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act.
The 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act Are Inconsistent With The Proposed
Regulations on What Standard of Evidence Should be used in Campus Conduct Processes
In its Final Rule implementing the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the
Clery Act, the Department allowed institutions to select between the preponderance of the
evidence standard and the clear and convincing evidence standard. The Department allowed
institutions to select in their discretion, without emphasis on one standard over the other or
challenges to implementing the chosen standard. The Department received comments asking that
it require the “‘clear and convincing’ standard of evidence...because this standard better
safeguards due process.” 232 But the Department demurred writing that an institution “can comply
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with both Title IX and the Clery Act by using a preponderance of the evidence standard in
disciplinary proceedings.” 233
However, the Department’s instant Proposed Regulations instead set a standard that is
incongruent with what was previously stated in the VAWA Final Rule. Now, the Department is
putting significant bounds on when preponderance of the evidence can be used versus clear and
convincing evidence, with a clear intent to push recipients to use the higher standard. The
Department states:
...in reaching a determination regarding responsibility, the recipient must apply
either the preponderance of the evidence standard or the clear and convincing
evidence standard. The recipient may, however, employ the preponderance of the
evidence standard only if the recipient uses that standard for conduct code
violations that do not involve sexual harassment but carry the same maximum
disciplinary sanction. The recipient must also apply the same standard of evidence
for complaints against students as it does for complaints against employees,
including faculty. 234
This is a reversal of previous policy without any explanation from the Department other
than the fact that campus conduct processes are not the same as civil litigation. 235 This, frankly is
not enough of a showing to warrant such a drastic reversal in course. The Department has never
contended before now that campus conduct processes must hold the same level of “process” as a
lawsuit in federal court, and it is clear that was never Congress’ intent based on much of the
commentary in the 2013 VAWA Final Rule. The tying of this standard to those in place for
employees and faculty is also arbitrary and capricious; such standards are often collectively
bargained and tailored specifically to the circumstances of particular employees. There was no
sufficient basis given for tying a standard for student discipline to that of employee or faculty
discipline. Again, the Department is imposing a one-size fits all approach on colleges without
concern for the nuances and considerations that may be at play. For the foregoing reasons,
SUNY requests that the Proposed Regulations be withdrawn.
iv. §106.45(b)(2)(i)(B) - Notice of allegations upon receipt of formal
complaint
SUNY takes issue with this specific section of the Department’s Proposed Regulations
because there is now a major ambiguity regarding what constitutes “sufficient time,” and because
the notice the Department now requires is far more detailed than what is required in criminal
investigations.
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“Sufficient Time” Creates a Major Ambiguity in Interpretation
The Proposed Regulations require written notice to the parties of all hearings,
investigative interviews, or other meetings with a party, “with sufficient time for the party to
prepare to participate.” 236 We are concerned that requiring “sufficient time” for preparation
creates a major ambiguity in Title IX proceedings. It will inevitably be exploited during the
proceeding to create undue delays, and be deployed in post-hearing litigation and OCR
investigations as a due process wedge. Campus codes of conduct generally limit a party’s right to
request adjournments to several days, absent good cause, because of the risk that a party will
delay the proceeding. Such delays prejudice the rights of the parties to obtain a fair hearing. The
“sufficient time” clause leaves the door open for unwarranted legal maneuvers that will
compromise the due process rights of the parties. Therefore, SUNY requests that the Proposed
Regulations be withdrawn due to the ambiguities created by this provision.
Notice is More Detailed than what is Required in Criminal Investigations
Not only does dictating the terms of the required notice infringe on SUNY’s academic
freedom under the First Amendment, but its structure undermines the ability of campuses to
effectively adjudicate cases of sexual harassment and sexual violence.
As indicated in Part I of this letter, the Department has not offered a specific showing for
why it must upset its longstanding interpretation of Title IX in favor of prescriptive, top-down
policies that conflict with the text and purpose of the statute. Nor has the Department justified
why the level of due process provided to Respondents, who face expulsion or suspension from
voluntary higher education, is higher than the notice provided to criminal defendants, who face
the loss of their liberty (or in some states for some crimes, life).
As the Secretary is aware, campus investigations of sexual violence often run
concurrently with the criminal justice process. Campuses coordinate how they will question the
Respondent, Reporting Individual, and witnesses with police to ensure a fair and effective
process. Here, the Proposed Regulations would require, “upon receipt of a formal complaint,”
that the Respondent be issued a detailed notice of the charges, and “sufficient time to prepare
before any initial interview.” 237 A campus investigator could not even begin to question the
Respondent until the Respondent knew of the charges and had “sufficient time to prepare,”
which presumably would involve consultation with an advisor or attorney.
This procedure elevates the notice rights of the Respondent well beyond any notice rights
afforded to an individual suspected of committing a crime. We are not aware of any jurisdiction
that prohibits a police officer from questioning an individual without first obtaining an
indictment (the closest analog to a “formal complaint”), providing that individual with the
indictment, and then giving the individual “sufficient time to prepare” before questioning. Nor
can we imagine that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence would support such fetters on policing.
Police may approach a suspect and start questioning right away. They can even lie to the suspect
236
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or hide their identity as a police officer. With certain exceptions, evidence obtained in this
manner may be used in the investigation and prosecution. The Department must make a strong
case under Mathews v. Eldridge 238 to support such a drastic imbalance in the due process rights
of criminal defendants and administrative Respondents, and has not done so anywhere in the
body of these proposals. Further, the Department would need to show that this additional notice
is required to ameliorate discrimination on the basis of sex.
Not only is this proposal Constitutionally-unsound, but it will have several pernicious
impacts on campus investigations of sexual violence. First, it will interfere with the ability of
campus officials to conduct concurrent investigations with police. Take a case where the
Reporting Individual goes to the Title IX office, rather than the police, to report a sexual assault.
A formal complaint is drafted. Then, the Reporting Individual decides to file a report with the
local police. Immediately upon receiving the report, a police officer goes to the Respondent’s
residence hall and questions the Respondent. Then, the Title IX coordinator sends the required
notice to the Respondent. The Respondent has now been questioned about the charges without
receiving the necessary notice and time to prepare. Has the process now been tainted by a due
process violation, such that the campus cannot move forward on its internal, federally-required
investigation? This amounts to a fundamental violation of the Reporting Individual’s Title IX
rights, particularly since the Reporting Individual has no way of anticipating how these
overlapping enforcement entities will pursue the complaint.
Second, by including a statement prohibiting “knowingly making false statements or
knowingly submitting false information during the grievance process,” 239 the required notice
may discourage Reporting Individuals and Respondents from participating in the process, out of
fear that their statements may be used against them. While most colleges already have such
policies detailing consequences for false statements, by requiring specific language in the notice,
the Proposed Regulations will send a specific but unnecessary message to students that may deter
participation. Respondents could use this language to demand charges be brought against
Reporting Individuals for submitting false statements and vice versa. By discouraging reporting,
the required notice promises to make the grievance process less effective, less fair, and not
impartial, in contradiction of the Proposed Regulations and the Department’s longstanding
guidance regarding Title IX. As with other aspects of these Proposed Regulations, there is no
showing that false statements impact individuals differently on the basis of gender, occur
differently from different genders, or that this specific statement will ameliorate inequality on the
basis of gender.
v. §106.45(b)(3)(vi) - Elementary and secondary schools – may require a
live hearing
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations on the basis that they create
extreme confusion for recipients, Reporting Individuals and Respondents, and give lower due
process rights to individuals who deserve a higher amount of due process for a mandatory
property right.
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Differences in Approach Between K-12 and Higher Education Will Lead to Needless
Confusion
These Proposed Regulations draw bright line distinctions between K-12 and college and
university education in a manner that does not necessary reflect the realities of enrollment and
education within the State University of New York and other higher education institutions and
systems. Proposed Regulations §106.45(b)(3)(vi) and (vii) establish significantly different
systems for adjudicating allegations of harassment and assault. At the elementary and secondary
level, institutions may or may not require a live hearing. Questions must be asked of both parties,
including follow-up questions, but they need not be conducted live and there is no role for
advisors (including attorneys) of the parties to cross-examine the other party. 240 For institutions
of higher education, the Proposed Regulations mandate a live hearing that must allow for crossexamination of parties by the advisor of choice of the other party. Further, if a party does not
have an advisor, the institution must provide an advisor “aligned with that party to conduct crossexamination.” If the party or witness chooses not to submit to cross-examination, the “decisionmaker must not rely on any statement of that party or witness in reaching a determination
regarding responsibility.” 241 In other words, the expectations and experiences of student
participants in a K-12 and higher education adjudication process will be markedly different.
Modern education does not necessarily match the neat lines and standardized approaches
of yesteryear. Colleges and high schools have developed myriad programs that include dual
enrollment, summer and intersession college learning, high school laboratory schools on college
campuses, colleges operating K-12 charter schools, and situations as simple as high school
students who enroll in college classes. Further, colleges regularly return their students to
elementary and secondary schools as student teachers and related experience based learning
assignments.
By maintaining strict differences in the process between K-12 and higher education, the
Department will necessarily create confusing situations where students will not know precisely
which system—and accompanying rights—apply in their case. Do the rights run with the
Reporting Individual or the Respondent? What if one Reporting Individual in a multi-report case
is a high school student and the other a college student? What if a college student discloses
harassment by a high school student? What of a high school student disclosing harassment or an
assault in a college class or a dual-enrollment program? Is it different if the Respondent is a
fellow high school student dual-enrolled in the college class? What if the Respondent is an
employee of the high school? Or an employee of the College? What of a college investigating
whether one of its students committed harassment against a high school student or students in a
student teaching assignment? What if multiple elementary school students report assault by a
college-level student teacher? Must the Title IX Coordinator at the college move forward with a
report, identify the elementary school students to the Respondent student teacher, but then find
the Respondent not in violation if the children refuse to be subjected to cross-examination by the
Respondent’s advisor of choice (after all, none of their prior statements would be admissible in
the college process if they refuse to be cross-examined)? Must the college then return that
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student teacher to a different elementary school, exposing additional children to harassment or
violence, since they have been found not responsible in the prescribed Title IX process?
In any of these cases, one is hard pressed to determine from the plain language of the
Proposed Regulations which set of rules and responsibilities apply, or whether they only partly
apply. While this will cause confusion among education professionals and lead to significant
litigation costs defending various permutations in lawsuits filed by Reporting Individuals and
Respondents at different education levels, it will be even more confusing for students, who will
not know whether and to whom to report, and what rights and challenges they will face in
reporting. In a society in which reporting harassment and assault at all levels—from elementary
school through professional employees—is depressed by the challenges that face those who
disclose, this confusing labyrinth of rules will further depress reporting and disclosure among
students in dual enrollment and other programs where the lines between high school and college
are simply not as clear cut as these Proposed Regulations would imagine. We urge the
Department to follow longstanding practice (including the 2001 Notice and Comment Dear
Colleague Letter, and 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2017 Dear Colleague Letters) and set uniform,
high-level, standards equally applicable to elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education
systems.
We can find no evidence offered in the Preamble for drawing such a bright line between
K-12 and higher education. Nor do we see any evidence that the bright line is drawn to address
and redress sex discrimination in education. This appears to be an arbitrary line drawn between
high school seniors and college freshmen, based on an outdated and inaccurate assumption of the
age and competency of all K-12 and all college students, without any evidence offered. But there
is no such clear line of the maturity level of students that would support a clear line of different
processes. The Department devotes a mere 59 words—four of which are “may” or “most”
indicating likelihood, but not certainty—to support a distinction that will have significant impact
on millions of K-12, college, and mixed jurisdiction Reporting Individuals and Respondents.
“Because most parties and many witnesses are minors in the elementary and secondary school
context, sensitivities associated with age and developmental ability may outweigh the benefits of
cross-examination at a live hearing...In contrast, the Department has determined that at
institutions of higher education, where most parties and witnesses are adults, grievance
procedures must include live cross-examination at a hearing.” 242
Respectfully, Mathews v. Eldridge 243 and its progeny would require far more analysis
before drawing hard line conclusions of the appropriate balance of due process during various
processes. And even that would assume that the plain language of Title IX even provided
jurisdiction to enact such narrow and detailed distinctions between important proceedings at
various educational institutions (language we cannot find in the statute).
Further, we would note the interesting reversal of expectations for due process within K12 and higher education. Elementary and secondary education is compulsory. It is a right
guaranteed by federal law and state law in every jurisdiction in the United States. A young
person of eligible age may seek public education as a right. Higher education is not a right under
242
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federal or state law. While some colleges are “open admission” offering admission to all
qualified students, that still is not a legal requirement and those institutions may place academic
and behavioral limitations on whom they admit. Colleges have First Amendment rights to
determine, among other things, “who may be admitted to study.” 244 It is clear that the property
rights that accumulate in K-12 are greater than the property rights that accumulate in higher
education as the K-12 rights are guaranteed by law. Concomitantly, any due process obligations
imposed (if there was authority in the law to impose them) should be equal or greater in the
compulsory K-12 sphere than in higher education since the deprivation would be of a right
guaranteed in state law. Yet these Proposed Regulations invert the levels of due process
requiring significantly more process in the lower property rights that apply in higher education
than in the compulsory K-12.
vi. §106.45(b)(3)(vii) – Cross-Examination and Advisor of Choice
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations regarding cross-examination and
advisor of choice for numerous reasons. The Department’s changes are an overreach that do not
follow binding authority and will cause recipients skyrocketing costs. The Proposed Regulations
will cause needless confusion in relation to cross-examination, and result in significant due
process violations. The provisions relating to exclusion of all evidence relating to a party or
witness if they refuse to subject themselves to cross-examination will create significant issues for
recipients, Reporting Individuals and Respondents. Further, the Proposed Regulations are in
direct conflict with the Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act.
Lastly, requiring on the spot detailed explanations for each such determination as to why
evidence is excluded in a hearing is a higher standard than judges adhere to in civil and criminal
adjudications in courts and will lengthen hearings while inevitably raising litigation costs.
Proposed Regulations on Cross-Examination are an Overreach by the Department, do not
Follow Binding Authority and Will Skyrocket Costs for Recipients
Perhaps the Department’s most overreaching proposal is its requirement that colleges and
universities (but, puzzlingly, not K-12 institutions where attendance is a right under the law of
every state) provide a live hearing and cross-examination by the advisor of choice for each party
and provide advisors to students without one to conduct cross-examination on their behalf. 245 No
court has ever required this level of due process for an accused party in a campus disciplinary
proceeding. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor Congress have ever anticipated this mandate as
a due process requirement. And such a policy is manifestly in error, as it will unduly complicate
campus affairs, dramatically raise costs, and inflict trauma on Reporting Individuals and
Respondents alike, without any corresponding benefit to seeking the truth.
Ostensibly, the Department acts according to its reading of case law emanating from one
split Circuit Court decision. While we appreciate the Department’s statement that “[t]he
Proposed Regulations would help ensure that the obligations imposed on recipients fall within
the scope of the civil rights law that Congress created,” we object to its reservation that these
244
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regulations will, “where persuasive, align with relevant case law.” 246 Case law must be followed
in the jurisdictions covered by its courts, whether “persuasive” to Department staff or otherwise.
While the Department enthusiastically cites a 2-1 decision of a Sixth Circuit panel, Doe v. Baum,
on the issue of cross-examination, that decision only binds four states, is inconsistent with
myriad decisions of other Circuits and state law (and even other Sixth Circuit decisions), and the
decision itself does not demand the criminal justice-level procedures of the Proposed
Regulations. 247
To that point, federal courts of appeals have roundly rejected the Department’s strained
analogy between the student conduct and the criminal justice process. Justice Harry Blackmun,
writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasized that “school regulations are not to
be measured by the standards which prevail for the criminal law and for criminal procedure.” 248
Courts understand that student discipline is part of the education process. When a student is
removed from the academic community, the purpose is not punitive in the criminal law sense,
but a determination that the student is not qualified to remain part of the community. Expelled
students may suffer damaging effects, but they do not face imprisonment, fines,
disenfranchisement, or probation. 249
Frankly, there are Supreme Court decisions that require far different balances of due
process in education discipline cases. Colleges and universities should not be required to ignore
binding judicial precedent and separately enacted state law and federal law simply because
current representatives of the Department find a recent 2-1 decision of one Circuit court more
“persuasive.” That is inconsistent with interpretations of federalism, administrative law, and the
general rule of law.
Here, precedent is clear that cross-examination is not a constitutional requirement in
campus conduct proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has never required it in such
administrative settings; indeed, it held in Goss v. Lopez that “[n]o better instrument has been
devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the
case against him and opportunity to meet it.” 250 The Court has never held that cross-examination
is necessary under these circumstances to satisfy procedural due process.
In turn, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which governs SUNY institutions, holds
that “the right to cross examine witnesses has not been considered an essential requirement of
due process in school disciplinary proceedings.” 251 Most recently, in Doe v. Colgate University
(2019), the Second Circuit affirmed that a university’s sexual misconduct hearing did not violate
Title IX when it considered hearsay evidence and did not permit the Respondent to directly
cross-examine the Reporting Individuals. 252 The court noted that the university permitted both
246
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parties to submit questions to one another through the nonvoting chair of the hearing, as well as
to submit questions to the Title IX investigator, and that neither party was allowed to directly
cross-examine the other. 253 The court identified nothing in this procedure that violated the rights
of the parties or demonstrated gender bias against men. 254
The Department’s proposal, moreover, exceeds anything required in the line of Sixth
Circuit decisions referenced in Doe v. Baum. The Sixth Circuit does not require that campuses
falling within its jurisdiction hold adversarial proceedings with cross-examination by the advisor
of choice for each party in every case. Rather, it has identified that the “Supreme Court has
declined to set out a universal rule and instead instructs lower courts to consider the parties’
competing interests.” 255 Applying Goss v. Lopez and the balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, the Sixth Circuit holds that “when the university’s determination turns on the
credibility of the accuser, the accused, or witnesses, that hearing must include an opportunity for
cross-examination.” 256 The Sixth Circuit cautions, however, that the university need only provide
“some form of cross-examination” 257 when credibility is at issue. There are many college
disciplinary cases which are fact-specific but do not necessarily rely on credibility. Often the
weight of the evidence is clear, or it is backstopped by video or other electronic evidence. Or a
party has already admitted conduct and the only question is what sanction is appropriate. Going
even beyond this Sixth Circuit case, the Proposed Regulations would seem to require that parties
subject themselves to cross-examination when credibility is not at issue. Here there is much harm
and no gain to the process.
We likewise note that the same Sixth Circuit just one year earlier declined to strike down
a “circumscribed form of cross-examination” that “involves submitting written questions to the [
] panelists.” 258 Such trauma-informed questioning—directed through a panel, rather than against
the other party—has become the norm among institutions of higher education, and was
approved, without comment, by the Second Circuit in Doe v. Colgate University. 259 The
Department acknowledges this state of practice and specifically allows this system elsewhere in
the Proposed Regulations for investigations and adjudications in K-12. 260 Such a bright line
comes without evidence and, indeed, is contrary to the evidence.
The Sixth Circuit also has never announced a per se rule akin to proposed section 106.45
(3)(vii) that a hearing board cannot consider an out-of-court statement by a witness who declines
253
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to be cross-examined. In fact, the Sixth Circuit held in Doe v. University of Cincinnati “that
admission of hearsay evidence [at a school disciplinary proceeding] is not a denial of procedural
due process.” 261 Federal and state rules of evidence appropriate to courtrooms do not apply in
campus disciplinary proceedings, and hearsay evidence may be admitted and considered to the
extent it is relevant to the ultimate question of responsibility. The Department has not, and
cannot, provide any statutory or judicial authority allowing it to mandate such rules of evidence
for campus disciplinary proceedings.
Finally, as a matter of law, judicial precedent holds that cross-examination is not required
in myriad civil court and administrative proceedings that can result in significant property and
liberty deprivations. The U.S. Supreme Court has not announced a “blanket rejection by the
Court of administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and probative value,” and
holds that hearsay evidence may constitute substantial evidence supporting an administrative
finding. 262 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holds,
“[w]e have rejected a per se approach that brands evidence as insubstantial solely because it
bears the hearsay label. . . . Instead, we evaluate the weight each item of hearsay should receive
according to the item’s truthfulness, reasonableness, and credibility.” 263
Administrators base fundamental liberty interests on hearsay evidence. Liberty interests
are traditionally valued higher than property interests. Prison administrators, for example, may
rely on hearsay evidence of a prisoner’s alleged criminal activity within the prison to make a
finding of responsibility that adds years to the prisoner’s sentence. 264 Child welfare officials may
also depend on hearsay to determine child custody if it is relevant and probative, particularly
where the parent waives the right to cross-examine the child. 265 Thus, a video-recorded interview
may be offered to establish proof of child sexual abuse, sufficient to remove a parent’s visitation
rights, where the parent raises no specific objection to the reliability of the evidence. 266
Agencies may also rely on hearsay to decide other liberty and property interests. Crossexamination is not an absolute requirement in a Social Security Disability benefits case, 267 a
hearing to revoke a police officer’s duty disability payments, 268 an action to revoke a store’s
cigarette and lottery license, 269 a Coast Guard finding that a pilot negligently operated a boat, 270
a Department of Agriculture finding of animal abuse based on a four-year-old veterinary
261
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record, 271 or a Department of Environmental Protection decision to designate a waterway as a
fishery. 272
Limitations on cross-examination also apply in cases where individuals face the
suspension or loss of employment or their professional licenses. 273 An administrative agency
may support its termination decision on hearsay statements drafted by the terminated employee’s
superiors, as long as those statements bear the indicia of reliability. 274 A police officer contesting
his termination does not necessarily have the right to cross-examine laboratory technicians who
administered a positive drug test, 275 nor do physicians have the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses in license suspension hearings in a manner comparable to the criminal justice
system. 276 This despite the fact that any of these processes affect significant property interests, if
not liberty interests.
This discretion is derived from basic principles of administrative law and a concern for
the separation of powers. Courts will not impose cross-examination as a due process requirement
where the legislature has not authorized the administrative body with subpoena power, as this
allows the agency to act in a manner contrary to its enabling statute. 277 If the body cannot force a
witness to appear (as in most college proceedings where the institution and parties generally do
not have subpoena powers), then it cannot be foreclosed from relying on hearsay testimony of
absent witnesses. Thus, where lawmakers require cross-examination and the right to an attorney
in civil and administrative proceedings, they will clearly and unambiguously set forth this
elevated procedure in law. 278
Along with these legal considerations, as neutral bodies, whose obligations extend
equally to Reporting Individual and Respondent, SUNY holds numerous practical concerns
about the ability to maintain fair and impartial proceedings under proposed section
106.45(3)(vii).
Cross-examination threatens to weaponize the hearing process against the Reporting
Individual, and risks intimidation and victim-blaming. Contrary to the Proposed Regulations’
ban on the use of sex stereotypes, cross-examination of rape complaints often utilizes rape myths
271

Crawford v United States Dep’t of Agric., 50 F3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA, 372 F.3d 441, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
273
Johnson v United States, 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
274
Lacson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 726 F.3d 170, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
275
Matter of Gordon v. Brown, 84 N.Y.2d 574, 578 (NY Ct App 1994)
276
Matter of Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 352–353, (NY Ct App 1947) (limitation on right to
confront investigators in suspension hearing for performing illegal procedures); See also Matter of Yoonessi v. State
Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 2 A.D.3d 1070, 1072, 769 N.Y.S.2d 326 (NY 3d Dep’t 2003), lv. denied 3
N.Y.3d 607, 785 N.Y.S.2d 24, 818 N.E.2d 666 (2004) (limitation on cross-examination of board’s expert witness
not an abuse of discretion); Sookhu v. Commissioner of Health of State of New York, 31 A.D.3d 1012 (3d Dep’t NY
2006) (cross-examination of patient not required in license suspension hearing).
277
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Stamps, 898 So.2d 664, 676 (Sup. Ct., Miss. 2005).
278
E.g., North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 116-40.11 (student right to be represented by counsel, at student’s own expense,
in campus disciplinary hearings, except in cases of academic dishonesty or where institution maintains a “Student
Honor Court”); Mass. Gen. L. 71 § 37H 3/4 (student facing expulsion or suspension for more than ten days for
bullying has the right to cross-examination and the right to counsel).
272

Page 63 of 82
Published by The Keep, 2019

63

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 44

and victim-blaming language to discredit witnesses, causing a phenomenon known as “secondary
victimization.”279 Regardless, the Department does not actually offer an evidence-based study
supporting its unique effectiveness as a means of detecting lies.
Yet this untested assumption bears further scrutiny should it be mandated at every college
and university covered by Title IX. Empirical studies of cross-examination suggest that its
storied reputation as a truth-seeking device may be more mythic than real. In particular, a 2017
survey of available scientific evidence published in the Cornell Journal of Law and Public
Policy contends that the “observable behavioral cues” derived from cross-examination do little to
aid laypeople and experts in detecting lies. 280 “From evasive eyes to twitching toes, behavioral
responses to questioning seem to be more idiosyncrasies than deception giveaways.” 281 Notably,
many of the cues that observers associate with deception may simply be reactions to the stress of
an adjudicatory hearing, and the lawyer’s demeanor in questioning the witness may also
prejudicially impact how the observer judges the testimony. 282 While cross-examination can
have the salutary effect of disrupting efforts to maintain a lie, research demonstrates that
witnesses can be enticed by questioners to distort the truth, even among adult victims.283 This
result is by design: lawyers avoid asking a question they do not already know the answer to,
making cross-examination an exercise in creating “a carefully crafted narrative at the expense of
broader context and accuracy.” 284
The Proposed Regulations are also certain to tilt disciplinary proceedings in favor of
parties who have the means to afford attorneys who are skilled at cross-examination. The
Department may imagine that this will only limit the testimony of Reporting Individuals but not
Respondents, the protected party of interest. But some Reporting Individuals may be represented
by highly-skilled attorneys, sometimes pro bono, while some Respondents may bring a friend or
family member.
Yet because colleges and universities have affirmative duties in the Proposed Regulations
to ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, they may have to cover the costs of expert litigators on
behalf of Reporting Individuals or Respondents to ensure equal representation between the
parties. The Department has previously acknowledged that it lacks statutory authority to mandate
legal representation in these proceedings. 285 Requiring cross-examination by an “advisor” rather
than an “attorney” is a thinly-veiled means of circumventing the Department’s own five-year-old
regulations and interpretations of the Clery Act. And it masks the true costs of supplying
attorney-advisors in campus disciplinary proceedings.
After all, having offered no research to support its unprecedented advisor requirement,
the Department cannot begin to estimate how high these costs will be. Because both the
Reporting Individual and the Respondent have the right to an impartial proceeding under Title
279
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IX, in theory, both should have access to equal representation. Allowing one party to hire
litigators from a prestigious trial law firm, while allowing the other to be represented by a wellmeaning professor, coach, friend or parent without training in cross-examination, could be a
facial inequality that opens recipients to a Title IX challenge which, under the Proposed
Regulations could result in OCR overturning a finding of responsibility on an appeal from a
Respondent (while a similar complaint filed by a Reporting Individual would result in no action
by OCR under the partial safe harbor). If a recipient responds by hiring an attorney for the
unrepresented party, and pays the costs of that attorney, then the other side can plausibly argue a
Title IX violation in having to personally bear the costs of legal representation. The result is that
the recipient may receive challenges seeking that it indemnify both parties for their legal
representatives.
Institution costs will skyrocket, as the incentive to hire an attorney in campus proceedings
will be very high. If the campus pays the cost of representation, then both parties will rely on
lawyers, rather than any other type of “advisor,” to represent them in these proceedings. These
attorneys must be allowed to participate in all aspects of the proceeding, including pre-hearing
conferences, pre-hearing examination of the investigatory report, the hearing, the sanctions
hearing, and the appeal. The attorneys will write pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, responses
to the investigatory reports, appeal briefs, and various other correspondence. The attorneys will
also be involved in gathering and submitting evidence to the fact-finder. At the rate of $250 per
hour (a conservative rate in New York State), the likely costs of a single proceeding will easily
run into the tens of thousands of dollars and, unfortunately, since federal funding to absorb these
new costs demanded by the Proposed Regulations is unlikely, costs will likely have to be passed
on to students or institutions will have to cut academic programs or student services to make up
for the new expense.
We also note that the requirement that the advisor of choice be allowed to conduct the
cross-examination is actually not limited to attorneys trained in litigation (not even all attorneys
are actually trained in direct and cross-examination). The Department’s Proposed Regulations
would allow the fraternity brother or sorority sister, parent, roommate, or anyone else to conduct
cross-examination, so long as the party said they were the chosen advisor. Cross-examination
may or may not be the “greatest legal engine,” but it is doubtful that Dean Wigmore was
imagining that such cross-examination would be conducted by an untrained 19-year-old friend of
the party. Whatever gain to truth-seeking the Department imagines would occur with genteel
attorneys ethically asking probing questions is sure to be outweighed by the grave trauma and
harm caused by unskilled advisors “playing attorney” while likely elucidating few, if any, facts
that could not have been learned in a less adversarial, more educational manner.
Significant Harm to Both Reporting Individuals and Respondents if all Evidence is
Excluded When Anyone Will Not Submit to Cross Examination
The Proposed Regulations bar the institutional decision maker from considering the
testimony or account of any participant who does not subject themselves to cross-examination by
the advisor of the other party. The Department states: “[i]f a party or witness does not submit to
cross-examination at the hearing, the decision-maker must not rely on any statement of that party
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or witness in reaching a determination regarding responsibility[.]” 286 While this clearly impacts
Reporting Individuals as noted elsewhere herein, it likewise can have significant and severe
consequences for Respondents. Inasmuch as the Proposed Regulations define harassment to
include sexual assault as defined by the Clery Act, and the Clery Act itself takes its definitions
from the Uniform Crime Reporting and National Incident Based Reporting System, 287 the same
facts that may undergird a Title IX disciplinary charge may also be a crime, and disclosures of
such facts may lead to criminal charges (and in some cases, a civil suit).
For that reason, attorneys for Respondents may advise their clients not to testify in a
formal hearing or subject themselves to cross examination where they could make statements
against penal interest, generally admissible as an exception to the hearsay prohibition in criminal
and civil courts. 288 Instead, many institutions have traditionally accepted written statements or
other methods of providing information, with decision makers according different weight to an
uncrossed statement than would be given to crossed testimony.
With these limiting rules, however, the Proposed Regulations would prohibit the decision
maker from considering any statements by Respondent. To the extent that a Reporting Individual
testifies, is willing to subject themselves to cross examination by the advisor of the Respondent,
and is generally credible, these rules would nearly certainly require the institution to find the
Respondent responsible under either a preponderance or clear and convincing standard without
considering any denials or different account the Respondent might have provided. But such a
silencing by regulation nearly certainly offends the due process rights of such a Respondent,
since they would not be able to defend themselves in any way (including having prior statements
to law enforcement or college officials considered on their behalf) unless they were willing to
risk inculpating themselves in a criminal or civil proceeding. In such cases, an alternative model
that does not include the formal cross examination requirement or allows for uncrossed evidence
to be taken into account “for what it’s worth” by the decision maker provides significantly more
due process and fundamental fairness to such a Respondent.
Based on the narrative in the Proposed Regulations, it is clear that such harm to
Respondents in Title IX cases was not its intention. The Department stated in its background:
The Proposed Regulations require schools to investigate and adjudicate formal
complaints of sexual harassment, and to treat complainants and Respondents
equally, giving each a meaningful opportunity to participate in the investigation
and requiring the recipient to apply substantive and procedural safeguards that
provide a predictable, consistent, impartial process for both parties and
increase the likelihood that the recipient will reach a determination
regarding the Respondent's responsibility based on objective standards and
relevant facts and evidence. 289
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Therefore, the proposed rule should be withdrawn because of the harm it will cause
Respondents who might be advised not to appear in the hearing process or subject themselves to
cross-examination.
The 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act State Reflect Congressional Intent in
Regard to Providing Advisors and Cross-Examination in Campus Conduct Processes
In the Final Rules implementing the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act, the
Department was interpreting a statute that required, in black letter, that “the accuser and the
accused are entitled to the same opportunities to have others present during an institutional
disciplinary proceeding, including the opportunity to be accompanied to any related meeting or
proceeding by an advisor of their choice.” 290 This is far more detailed and specific to details of
access to an advisor of choice than the 37 words of the Title IX statute. Since Congressional
intent was fairly plain from the language of the statute, the Department reasonably interpreted
“of their choice” to mean that the identity and professional qualifications of the advisor belonged
to the Reporting Individual and Respondent, not to the institution. That is to say, an institution
could not ban a participating student from choosing an attorney. While the negotiated rulemaking
process included a spirited discussion of the policy wisdom of this minor extension, there was
general assent to the Department’s interpretation of the plain language of the supporting statute.
During the commenting process, “[o]ne commenter asked that the final regulations
require institutions to provide legal representation in any meeting or disciplinary proceeding in
which the accused or the accuser has legal representation but the other party does not.” 291
The Department responded to this comment by following time-tested administrative law
principles. “We do not believe that the statute permits us to require institutions to provide legal
representation in any meeting or disciplinary proceeding in which the accused or the accuser has
legal representation but the other party does not. Absent clear and unambiguous statutory
authority, we would not impose such a burden on institutions.”292 Again, and to emphasize, when
faced with a statute that made specific reference to the presence of an advisor for the Reporting
Individual and Respondent in a case of sexual assault, and a request that the Department extend
that statutory provision by requiring that institutions provide an advisor to students who did not
have an advisor, the Department declined because “[a]bsent clear and unambiguous statutory
authority, we would not impose such a burden on institutions.”293
Unlike when interpreting the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act, there is not a
single reference to an advisor of choice anywhere in the Title IX statute. While SUNY does not
contest the wisdom of allowing students to have advisors of choice, and our campuses have since
time immemorial chosen on their own accord and in concert with due process to allow advisors
to be present in proceedings, at the students’ cost, we can find no statutory authority in Title IX
for the Department to require them to be provided to students at no cost in regulations pursuant
to Title IX. If a simple extension of a right guaranteed by the enacting federal law was, a mere 5
290
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years ago and immediately following passage of the enabling statute, considered to be outside of
the Department’s “clear and unambiguous statutory authority,” then certainly a statute that
completely lacks reference to advisors, attorneys or otherwise, participating or silent, and is
being interpreted by the Department this way for the first time more than 45 years after
enactment must even more clearly lack such authority. To put it plainly, the Department has
already acknowledged it lacks clear and unambiguous authority when it arguably might have had
such authority. Here, there is absolutely no authority, no evidence that providing or not providing
advisors has a disparate impact based on gender, and such a requirement is therefore arbitrary
and capricious under the law.
The requirement that colleges and universities allow for cross-examination by an advisor
of choice in sexual harassment cases under Title IX that are also within the definition of sexual
assault as defined by the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act runs in contrast to the plain
language of the rules and preamble promulgated pursuant to that law, just a few years ago. The
Department responded to concerns that advisors of choice, interpreted by the Department to
include attorneys, may interfere with the process and make the efficient investigation and
adjudication of sexual assault (and related) cases more legalistic and take it further away from
the educational model. The Department made several clear statements that institutions did not
have to allow advisors—including attorney advisors—to participate in any way, shape, or form.
“Institutions may restrict an advisor’s role, such as prohibiting the advisor from speaking during
the proceeding, addressing the disciplinary tribunal, or questioning witnesses. An institution may
remove or dismiss advisors who become disruptive or who do not abide by the restrictions on
their participation.” 294 Further, “Section 668.46(k)(2)(iv) allows an institution to establish
restrictions on an advisor’s participation in a disciplinary proceeding. As stated earlier in the
preamble, we believe that specifying what restrictions are appropriate or removing the ability of
an institution to restrict an advisor’s participation would unnecessarily limit an institution’s
flexibility to provide an equitable and appropriate disciplinary proceeding.” 295
The language of the VAWA regulations clearly allows colleges and universities to
prohibit advisors, including attorneys, from participating in any way, including prohibiting them
from conducting or participating in direct or cross examination. This language in the Final
VAWA Rules would cover those sexual harassment cases that are also sexual assault. While this
inconsistency does not impact most of K-12 or cases adjudicating verbal sexual harassment, it is
certainly noteworthy for those cases of sexual assault disclosed, investigated and adjudicated in
higher education under the Clery Act and Title IX.
Further, as discussed already, there is no statutory authority under Title IX to support a
requirement that institutions allow advisors, including attorneys, to participate in investigations
and adjudications under Title IX. The Department could have—and did not—at least made an
argument that the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act that required that parties be allowed to
bring an advisor of choice with them to required or optional hearings and related meetings would
likewise be effectuated if those advisors could participate. At least the Department in 2014
would have been simply stretching clear statutory language, not creating regulatory requirements
with no underlying statutory authority. We urge the Department to return to the conservative
294
295
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principles of administrative law that limits regulations to the clear statutory authority under
which they regulate.
In the Proposed Regulations, the Department would also require that institutions provide
advisors “aligned” with a student who does not have an advisor. The document does not define
“aligned,” and we fear that this will lead to litigation to determine what is required to properly
align. Further, it may be argued that the only way to truly “align” with a party is to develop a
formal “alignment.” In litigation and administrative complaints to OCR, parties may argue that
the only way to achieve this new regulatory requirement is through an attorney-client
relationship with the student party, one that requires the advisor to zealously advocate 296 for the
client and allows the client to provide information to the advisor in a way that is privileged. At
best, courts are likely to split on this question and various OCR Field Offices are likely to
interpret it differently, with some overturning determinations of a college if an advisor was not
considered aligned enough (due to the partial safe harbor in the Proposed Regulations, only
determinations that OCR views as harming the Respondent in the due process section could lead
to the determination being overturned; Determinations that are seen as harmful to the Reporting
Individual alone would likely be subject to the partial safe harbor). While the harms of further
legalizing the system are clear, this will also likely create inequity. Frankly, a creative student
can find the other party accompanied by a parent or sibling, demand an advisor paid for by the
college, receive an attorney, and have an advantage in cross-examination over the other party.
This will create a second-mover advantage, and such gamesmanship should have no place in the
Title IX and student conduct processes. If an advisor need not be an attorney, it will likewise
potentially lead to inequity as parties would have advisors with different skills and competencies
conducting cross-examination on their behalf.
If the institution is forced to hire and compensate the student party, the advisor will have
an incentive to create additional work for themselves, the institution and the other party, since
that will be tied to their compensation. This will further delay and bog down formal proceedings,
raising costs for institutions and students and delaying final determinations for both Reporting
Individuals and Respondents. Finally, the cost of providing such advisors may be astronomical
for institutions.
Explaining Decisions to Exclude Evidence during the Hearing
The Proposed Regulations impose an unusual burden on the fact-finder to “explain to the
party’s advisor asking cross-examination questions any decision to exclude questions as not
relevant.” 297 The Department offers no jurisdictional basis for imposing this micro-level mandate
on the hearing board, nor any statutory or judicial authority requiring administrative officials to
put on the record, during a live hearing, why they have permitted or excluded a question as
irrelevant. Presumably, a fact-finder excludes a question as being “not relevant” because it does
not tend to prove the matter at issue. 298 In other words, if it is not relevant, it is not relevant. The
296
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parties face no prejudice, much less prejudice of Constitutional proportions, where a fact-finder
does not explain why a question is not relevant, because the answer is self-evident: the factfinder does not believe it has a tendency to answer the ultimate question at issue. Therefore, this
provision promises much mischief, with no gain to truth-seeking.
vii. §106.45(b)(3)(viii) - Inspect and review evidence upon which recipient
does not intend to rely
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations because this provision relies on
technology that does not exist and forces institutions to share irrelevant information with
Respondents that is both deeply private and irrelevant to the investigation being conducted by the
institution.
Access to Evidence that is Not Relevant
Proposed section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) requires that the recipient must “[p]rovide both
parties an equal opportunity to inspect and review evidence obtained as part of the investigation
that is directly related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint, including the evidence
upon which the recipient does not intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding
responsibility, so that each party can meaningfully respond to the evidence prior to the
conclusion of the investigation.” 299
In addition to requiring recipients to provide this information electronically, through an
undisclosed and likely technologically unfeasible “file sharing platform” that prevents a party
from copying, downloading, or ostensibly using their smartphone to photograph the screen, the
Proposed Regulations require that this evidence be again provided “at any hearing” and for
purposes of cross-examination.
In explaining this section of the Proposed Regulations, the Department has used
justifications that include, “these requirements will facilitate each party’s ability to identify
evidence that supports their position and emphasize such evidence in their arguments to the
decision-maker.” 300 However, this statement is conclusory, unworkable, and conflicts with New
York State law.
Section 6444 of New York Education Law states that “[t]hroughout proceedings
involving such an accusation of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, or
sexual activity that may otherwise violate the institution’s code of conduct, [every student has]
the right”:***“[t]o review and present available evidence in the case file, or otherwise in the
possession or control of the institution, and relevant to the conduct case, consistent with
institution policies and procedures.” 301 There could be a situation where there are points that are
conceded factually, such as that both parties agreed that there was sexual intercourse, and the
question hinges upon affirmative consent. The Reporting Individual could have had a forensic
examination conducted. The forensic exam includes copious amounts of confidential information
299
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that is not relevant to the underlying question of whether there was affirmative consent, such as
whether the Reporting Individual has another medical condition or other trauma that would not
be relevant to the current question.
Likewise, it is possible that information about a Reporting Individual’s mental health
history could be disclosed to the Respondent, in direct violation of New York State law. 302 There
would be no gain in providing the Respondent access to this information that is not considered
“relevant” since the occurrence of sexual intercourse is conceded by both parties and would
cause significant harm to the Reporting Individual. With the way the regulation is drafted, it
would mandate sharing this information, and would cause significant harm potentially to both
Respondent and Reporting Individual, depending upon the type of information that is collected
during the course of the investigation.
But remember that it is not just Reporting Individuals who should fear overexposure of
deeply private information that is irrelevant to the determination. Respondents should be
concerned as well. The nature of such investigations is that some witnesses will provide
extraordinary amounts of information about Respondents, some of which is positive and some of
which is negative. Past bad acts, not relevant to the question of violation here, are often
discussed. The Respondent may seek to prove some positive point academically and in doing so,
turn over their transcript. Relevant to the question of affirmative consent? Clearly not. Covered
under this requirement that all evidence is provided? Likely so. Evidence might include the
Respondent’s other disciplinary records, their own medical records, mental health history, or past
sexual history, and other information that may be in the file, but is not relevant to the underlying
question of responsibility (and indeed may be protected from disclosure by New York State law).
In its effort to protect Respondents by creating a regime where a Reporting Individual’s life is
laid bare before the Respondent and their advisor or attorney, regardless of relevance to the
underlying matter, the Department is likewise creating a regime that may dissuade Respondents
from participating or being forthcoming, knowing that any information they provide, even if
irrelevant, even if more prejudicial than probative, even if completely detached from any matter
being considered in the conduct process, will be provided to the Reporting Individual and their
advisor or attorney.
Due to both the potential legal conflict with New York State Education Law Article 129B, the unworkable aspects the Department requires, and the ramifications it would have on
individuals involved in campus conduct processes, SUNY requests the Proposed Regulations be
withdrawn.
viii. §106.45(b)(3)(ix) - Investigative report must be created
SUNY opposes this section of the Department’s Proposed Regulations because of the
onerous and burdensome requirements the investigative report as outlined would put on
recipients and the ambiguity some of the language in this section creates.
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Investigative Report Requirement is Onerous and Burdensome on Recipients
Section 106.45(b)(3)(ix) of the Proposed Regulations requires recipients to generate an
“investigative report that fairly summarizes relevant evidence” and provide that report to the
parties for their “review and response” at least ten days before the hearing. 303 Even as the
Proposed Regulations effectively eliminate the “single investigator” model, it now imposes an
investigative report requirement that is administratively burdensome, impractical, and has limited
benefit as a truth-seeking technology.
To our knowledge, many college campuses generally do not create a single report prior to
the evidentiary hearing. Drafting such a report is time-consuming and requires the singular
attention of investigative staff, which is an unreasonable expense at many of our smaller
campuses. There is little corresponding benefit in truth-seeking to creating a comprehensive
report so far in advance of the hearing, moreover, because the very purpose of the hearing is to
try the evidence. The parties already are guaranteed the right to examine the evidentiary file prior
to the hearing under New York State Education Law Article 129-B; it goes beyond any due
process requirement we are aware of to have this information synthesized into a summary report
ten days before the hearing.
We also note that this requirement imposes a shadow cost in terms of the need for a
responsive report to the parties’ “review and response.” Presumably, the Proposed Regulations
cannot be satisfied unless the recipient amends its “investigative report” in light of the
“response” to “fairly summarize[ ] relevant evidence.” How these revisions must occur, and
according to what standard, are undefined, as are the practical and legal consequences of a
failure to respond, or failure to “fairly” respond, to the parties’ objections. Errors in such a
revision, we assume, could be appealed by Respondents to OCR seeking to have a responsibility
determination overturned. Errors that inappropriately led to a finding of responsibility, if
appealed by the Reporting Individual, would likely not be reviewed by OCR under the partial
safe harbor provision of these Proposed Regulations.
ix. §106.45(b)(5) - Appeals
SUNY opposes this section of the Department’s Proposed Regulations because of the
inequity it would create in appeals of findings, and the confusion this section causes due to the
Department including some measures that would not historically be included in an appeal.
The Proposed Regulations Create Inequity in Appeals of Findings
In terms of its requirements for appeal, even as the Department calls for campuses to
“[t]reat complainants and Respondents equitably” as a “basic requirement,” 304 the Proposed
Regulations are not equitable between a Reporting Individual and Respondent. While a
Respondent may appeal and seek to overturn both the underlying finding and the sanction, the
Department limits the appeal rights of the Reporting Individual. An earlier leaked version of the
Proposed Regulations would have allowed institutions to offer appeals either to Respondent only
303
304
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or to Respondent and Reporting Individual. The Violence Against Women Act amendments to
the Clery Act 305 and New York State Education Law 129-B 306 both require that appeals be
offered to both parties.
In the time prior to finalizing the Proposed Regulations, the Department changed the
language to require that appeals be offered to both parties, 307 but then undercut the value of the
Reporting Individual’s appeal, writing that in “cases where there has been a finding of
responsibility, although a complainant may appeal on the ground that the remedies are not
designed to restore or preserve the complainant’s access to the recipient’s education program or
activity, a complainant is not entitled to a particular sanction against the Respondent.” 308 But the
appeal of a student conduct finding is simply not the place to even ask for changes to remedies
other than the sanction levied against a person found responsible. It is not the place to appeal and
ask for academic accommodations, mental health counseling, or medical assistance. That is
through a separate process that, frankly, need not even involve the other party to a conduct
proceeding. By placing this limitation, not only does it invasively govern the processes of
institutions, but it makes such a “right” of appeal a right in name only as the one thing a
Reporting Individual would seek in a student conduct appeal would be barred by federal
regulation. This is an overstep and creates inconsistency and inequity in the process.
D. Directed Questions
Section D provides SUNY’s responses to certain directed questions as put forth by the
Department in the Preamble. Subsection (i) relates to question 1 (applicability to elementary and
secondary schools), subsection (ii) relates to question 2 (applicability of provisions based on type
of recipient or age of parties), subsection (iii) relates to question 3 (applicability of the rule to
employees), subsection (iv) relates to question 4 (training), subsection (v) relates to question 6
(standard of evidence), subsection (vi) relates to question 7 (potential clarification regarding
“directly related to the allegations” language), and subsection (vii) relates to question 8
(appropriate time period for record retention).
i. (Question 1) Applicability to elementary and secondary schools
As we indicated in our response to Proposed Regulations §106.45(b)(3)(vi) and (vii),
SUNY does not believe that a bright-line division between institutions of higher education and
primary and secondary schools is workable or appropriate, as modern education does not
necessarily match the neat lines and standardized approaches of yesteryear. These educational
environments overlap, with programs that include dual enrollment, summer and intersession
college learning, high school laboratory schools on college campuses, colleges operating K-12
charter schools, and situations as simple as high school students who enroll in college classes.
Further, colleges regularly return their students to elementary and secondary schools as
student teachers and related experience based learning assignments. Attempting to create two
305
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sets of processes along this line will create enormous confusion where students cannot identify
which system and surrounding rights apply to their case. Such confusion, as we indicate in our
response, above, will further depress reporting and disclosure among students in dual enrollment
and other programs where the lines between high school and college are simply not as clear cut
as these Proposed Regulations would imagine. We urge the Department to follow longstanding
practice (including the 2001 Notice and Comment Dear Colleague Letter, and the 2011, 2014,
2015, and 2017 Dear Colleague Letters) and set uniform, high-level, standards equally applicable
to elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education institutions and systems.
While we appreciate the Secretary’s effort to gather information on this topic, we note
that the Department has offered no evidence in the Preamble that the developmental level of the
parties or systematic differences between the K-12 and higher education settings merit different
standards of procedure when addressing sexual harassment. As we indicate in our response to the
second Direct Question, absent such a showing, there is no legal basis for the Department to add
more due process protections in the higher education setting, which is voluntary, than in the K12 setting, which is compulsory and a recognized property right.
Elementary and secondary education is compulsory. It is a right guaranteed by federal
law and state law in every jurisdiction in the United States. A young person of eligible age may
seek public education in their jurisdiction as a right. Higher education is not a right under federal
or state law. While some colleges are “open admission” offering admission to all qualified
students, that still is not a legal requirement and those institutions may place academic and
behavioral limitations on whom they admit. Colleges have First Amendment rights to determine,
among other things, “who may be admitted to study.” 309
It is clear that the property rights that accumulate in K-12 are greater than the property
rights that accumulate in higher education as the K-12 rights are guaranteed by law.
Concomitantly, any due process obligations imposed (if there were authority in the law to
impose them) should be equal or greater in the compulsory K-12 sphere than in higher education
since the deprivation would be of a right guaranteed in law. Yet these Proposed Regulations
invert the levels of due process requiring significantly more process before a deprivation of the
lower property rights (or quasi-property rights) that arguably apply in higher education than the
property rights that clearly apply in the compulsory K-12.
ii. (Question 2) Applicability of provisions based on type of recipient or
age of parties
The Secretary further requests comment on whether its Proposed Regulations, including
the “safe harbor” of §106.44(b) and the provision regarding written questions and crossexamination of §106.45(b)(3)(vi) and (vii), should differentiate on the basis of whether the
parties are age 18 or over, “in recognition of the fact that 18-year-olds are generally considered
to be adults for many legal purposes.” 310

309
310

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61483.

Page 74 of 82
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/44
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1838

74

et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited

Just as we can find no evidence offered in the Preamble for drawing a bright line between
K-12 and higher education, we do not see a showing that the due process rights afforded to a 17year-old first-year college student should be different than those provided to an 18-year-old first
year college student or an 18-year-old high school student. Nor do we see any evidence that the
bright line is drawn to address and redress sex discrimination in education. The Department
offers no evidence that an 18-year-old first-year college student will absorb less trauma from
cross-examination than a 17-year-old peer or that these differences are exacerbated based on sex.
This appears to be an arbitrary line drawn between high school seniors and college
freshmen, based on an outdated and inaccurate assumption of the age and competency of all K12 and college students, without any evidence offered. The Department devotes a mere 59
words—four of which are “may” or “most” indicating likelihood, but not certainty—to support a
distinction that will have significant impact on millions of K-12, college, and mixed jurisdiction
Reporting Individuals and Respondents. 311
Respectfully, even if the Department has the authority under the plain language of Title
IX to draw such narrow and detailed distinctions, Mathews v. Eldridge 312 and its progeny would
require far more analysis before drawing hard line conclusions of the appropriate balance of due
process during various processes.
iii. (Question 3) Applicability of the rule to employees
The Department’s Proposed Regulations Significantly Interfere with New York State Law,
New York City Law, and the State Collective Bargaining Agreements
The Secretary further requests comment on whether its Proposed Regulations would
prove unworkable in relation to employees. With this SUNY responds as follows:
a. The Proposed Regulations Interaction with Due Process Required by New York Civil
Service Law and/or Collective Bargaining Agreements
Taken together, SUNY employees constitute the largest segment of New York State
government employees. As a public employer, SUNY is required to comply with the State’s
Civil Service Laws and/or collective bargaining agreements (CBA) with various divisions of its
predominantly unionized employees. The Civil Service Law and applicable CBAs cover various
subjects such as employee pay, working conditions, and disciplinary measures for misconduct.
Such disciplinary measures include specific due process rights afforded to the represented
employees including, without limitation, the ability to file grievances and the right to seek
binding arbitration for all disciplinary-related reasons with an independent arbitrator. The due
process requirements imposed by law and/or by CBA are largely inconsistent with the
Department’s Proposed Regulations.
As a practical matter, collective bargaining negotiations in New York take place on a
statewide level at approximate six-year intervals. Put simply, SUNY’s compliance with the
311
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Proposed Regulations as written would require significant and substantial changes to most, if not
all, of its CBAs. While SUNY takes its compliance requirements seriously, the unions may not
want to open up their current agreements, would have no incentive to do so, and certainly would
be required to change policies and procedures that are already handled in their CBAs. Further,
some unions bargain statewide, not with SUNY, and would have even less incentive to make
changes to help one employer, especially if they may not be positive for some or all of their
members. Therefore, SUNY requests that the Department withdraw the Proposed Regulations or,
in the alternative, make clear the Proposed Regulations do not abrogate the rights and procedures
afforded to employees by law or by applicable CBAs.
b. Inconsistencies with Applicable State and Municipal Employment Discrimination Laws
SUNY respectfully notes that the proposed Regulations are inconsistent with New York
State’s related employment laws. For example, New York adopted a law that became effective
on October 9, 2018 requiring that all New York employers—including colleges and
universities—adopt a sexual harassment policy that, inter alia: prohibits sexual harassment;
provides a complaint process that allows for due process by all parties; makes clear any such
harassment is employee misconduct; informs employees of their rights; provides training to all
employees on an annual basis; and, prohibits retaliation against any individual that participates in
the reporting and/or investigation process. 313
On August 23, 2018, Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order to ensure
diversity and inclusion and to combat harassment and discrimination, including sex-based
discrimination at all levels of state government. 314
Similarly, in May 2018, New York City enacted a package of legislation to combat
workplace sexual harassment. The package consisted of 11 bills that will mandate anti-sexual
harassment training in the public and private sectors; make information about sexual harassment
available so more New Yorkers know their rights; require sexual harassment data reporting from
city agencies; and expand sexual harassment protections under the New York City Human
Rights Law (NYCHRL). 315 Under the NYCHRL, sexual harassment is a form of gender-based
discrimination that is defined as “unwelcome verbal or physical behavior based upon a person’s
gender.” This definition differs significantly from the definition of sexual harassment in the
Proposed Regulations. 316
Thus, the Proposed Regulations not only conflict with state and local government laws
generally but also infringe on said bodies police powers to manage its own affairs with regard to
employee conduct and investigating discrimination.
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c. The Proposed Regulations Interplay with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
As noted by the Department, a college or university employee may have rights against its
higher education employee under Title IX and also Title VII for sex-based discrimination.
Section 106.6(f) of the Proposed Regulations attempts to address this possible conflict by noting
that nothing in the Proposed Regulations shall be read as derogation of an employee’s rights
under Title VII or any regulations promulgated thereunder. However, it fails to address how an
employer should proceed when such a conflict arises between the two laws as interpreted. For
example, as with any civil case, Title VII discrimination claims generally utilize a preponderance
of the evidence standard. However, the Proposed Regulations indicate that an institution may
choose between the preponderance of the evidence standard and the clear and convincing
standard. This conflict creates an undue burden on institutions to manage standards of evidence
both in its own internal proceedings but also if the employee seeks external review by OCR or
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). As such, SUNY respectfully objects
to the ambiguity caused by the overly prescriptive nature of the Proposed Regulations.
In sum, due to the impact the Proposed Regulations will have on New York State
collective bargaining agreements, multiple areas of New York State and New York City law, and
the ambiguity caused by its inherent overlap with Title VII, SUNY believes the Proposed
Regulations should be withdrawn.
iv. (Question 4) Training
As we indicated in the introduction, we strongly support the Department’s requirement
that cases be investigated and adjudicated by those sufficiently trained in important concepts
central to these investigations, including an emphasis on the neutral role of institutions, and using
educational materials that are not based on sex stereotypes. The 2013 VAWA Amendments to
the Clery Act and New York State Education Law Article 129-B similarly require
comprehensive training and the State University of New York has committed itself to developing
and promulgating training materials to help its campuses, and fellow educational institutions,
continuously improve their response to, and prevention of, sexual harassment and sexual assault.
SUNY System Administration and the SUNY Student Conduct Institute 317 leadership and staff
have hosted hundreds of live and digital trainings over the last decade. Our campuses have
hosted thousands. We recognize that, as with any offering of due process and fair process before
a government action, the level of training and preparation is not uniform at all institutions across
the country. We hear and support the continued call of the Department to raise the capacity of
professionals at the higher education and K-12 levels, and SUNY will continue to develop
training materials and resources that can be accessed at no cost or very low cost to help fellow
institutions meet this need. We urge the Department to conform the training requirements to
317
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those published in the Final Rules implementing the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act to
avoid confusion and differing requirements.
The mandated training required of Title IX coordinators, investigators, and decisionmakers is not comprehensive of the categories mandated under VAWA, and therefore presents a
conflict of federal law. In particular, the training mandates under the Proposed Regulations
would not require these officials to receive training that “protects the safety of victims and
promotes accountability,” a phrase that is victim-centered and designed to ensure that institutions
are accountable to those harmed by sexual violence. Further, VAWA does not reference sex
stereotypes, which the University tries not to use in trainings, but which the Second Circuit
recently opined do not reflect gender bias.318 In practice, these officials will likely receive
training in VAWA and Title IX requirements, as well as Education Law Article 129-B if they
serve New York institutions, but any differences may cause needless confusion and disserve the
interests of all stakeholders to a fair process.
In considering training, while we applaud the Department’s requirements for training
those that work on the formal grievance process and urge the Final Regulations to conform with
current analogous requirements, we would note that the Proposed Regulations are devoid of any
training requirements or professional expectations for staff that work on an informal process.
While SUNY does not use an informal process to address cases of sexual assault (we may use
informal processes in certain harassment cases, depending upon the nature of the conduct and
other factors) we acknowledge that some institutions may choose to do so based upon the
imprimatur of the Department, and we urge the Department to set minimum standards for
training in that area as well, so that students are served by individuals with the highest level of
training, regardless of whether they go through a formal or informal process.
v. (Question 6) Standard of evidence
SUNY respectfully requests that the Department consider reversing course on the
standard of evidence. Currently, there are no bounds on using preponderance of the evidence
rather than clear and convincing evidence. 319 Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA
318
Doe v. Colgate Univ., 2019 WL 190515, at *9 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 2019) (Summary Order) (“John Doe contends
that Rugg, the Title IX Coordinator, introduced gender bias into the EGP process. Rugg trained EGP staff, and in
2014, she attended a training session for investigating campus sexual misconduct. Rugg’s notes from the session
indicate that investigators should refer to the complainant as a ‘complainant’ when talking to a respondent, but as the
‘victim’ or ‘survivor’ when talking to a complainant. Moreover, in her own training presentations, Rugg would
sometimes refer to complainants using female pronouns and respondents with male pronouns because in her
experience, most complainants were female and most respondents were male. This is insufficient evidence to
demonstrate that John Doe was expelled based on gender bias. There is no indication that Rugg’s use of such
pronouns reflects anything more than the statistical reality that most respondents are men and most complainants are
women, nor that calling complainants of any gender ‘victims’ or ‘survivors’ when speaking to them reflects gender
bias, rather than a desire to be sensitive.”).
319
A single District Court Judge in New Mexico ruled, without any explanation or citations at all, that
“preponderance of the evidence is not the proper standard for disciplinary investigations such as the one that led to
Lee’s expulsion, given the significant consequences” of a transcript notation. Lee v. The University of New Mexico,
1:17-cv-01230-JB-LF, *3 (D. N.M. Sep. 20, 2018). No other court that we can find has similarly ruled and there is
no explanation for this ruling in the opinion.
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amendments to the Clery Act and implementation of the Final Rule through a Negotiated
Rulemaking process demonstrates that this issue was well thought out in 2014 and, as such, the
Department should not reverse course due to the harm it would cause Reporting Individuals,
Respondents and institutions in attempting to implement something counter to what has already
been implemented and in place for years.
In its Final Rules implementing the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the
Clery Act, the Department allowed institutions to select equally, without emphasis on one
standard over the other or challenges to implementing the institution’s chosen standard. The
Department received comments asking that it require the “’clear and convincing’ standard of
evidence...because this standard better safeguards due process.” 320 But the Department
demurred, writing that an institution “can comply with both Title IX and the Clery Act by using a
preponderance of the evidence standard in disciplinary proceedings.” 321
These instant Proposed Regulations contain a clear reversal of previous policy without
any explanation from the Department other than the fact that campus conduct processes are not
the same as civil litigation. 322 The Department has never contended before now that campus
conduct processes must hold the same level of “process” as a lawsuit in federal court, and it is
clear that was never Congress’ intent based on much of the commentary in the 2013 VAWA
Final Rules. For the foregoing reasons, SUNY respectfully requests that the Department does not
reverse course on this standard.
vi. (Question 7) Potential clarification regarding “directly related to the
allegations” language
Proposed section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) requires that the recipient “[p]rovide both parties an
equal opportunity to inspect and review evidence obtained as part of the investigation that is
directly related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint, including the evidence upon
which the recipient does not intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding responsibility,
so that each party can meaningfully respond to the evidence prior to the conclusion of the
investigation.”
In addition to requiring recipients to provide this information electronically, through an
undisclosed and likely technologically unfeasible “file sharing platform” that somehow
completely prevents a party from downloading the documents apparently including using their
smartphone to photographing the screen, the Proposed Regulations require that this evidence be
again provided “at any hearing” and for purposes of cross-examination.
In explaining this section of the Proposed Regulations, the Department has used
justifications that include, “these requirements will facilitate each party’s ability to identify
evidence that supports their position and emphasize such evidence in their arguments to the
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decision-maker.” 323 However, this statement is conclusory, unworkable, conflicts with New
York State law, and makes no assertion that it is intended to address gender-based inequality.
Section 6444 of New York Education Law states that “[t]hroughout proceedings
involving such an accusation of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, or
sexual activity that may otherwise violate the institution’s code of conduct, [every student has]
the right”:***“[t]o review and present available evidence in the case file, or otherwise in the
possession or control of the institution, and relevant to the conduct case, consistent with
institution policies and procedures.” 324 There could be a situation where there are points that are
conceded factually, such as that both parties agreed that there was sexual intercourse, and the
question hinges upon affirmative consent. The Reporting Individual could have had a forensic
examination conducted. The forensic exam includes copious amounts of confidential information
that is not relevant to the underlying question of whether there was affirmative consent, such as
whether the Reporting Individual has another medical condition or other trauma that would not
be relevant to the current question.
Likewise, it is possible that information about a Reporting Individual’s mental health
history could be disclosed to the Respondent, in direct violation of New York State law. 325 There
would be no gain in providing the Respondent access to this information that is not considered
“relevant” since the occurrence of sexual intercourse is conceded by both parties and would
cause significant harm to the Reporting Individual. With the way the regulation is drafted, it
would mandate sharing this information, and would cause significant harm potentially to both
Respondent and Reporting Individual, depending upon the type of information that is collected
during the course of the investigation.
But remember that it isn’t just Reporting Individuals who should fear overexposure of
deeply private information that is irrelevant to the determination. Respondents should be
concerned as well. The nature of such investigations is that some witnesses will provide
extraordinary amounts of positive and negative information about Respondents. Past bad acts,
not relevant to the question of violation here, are often discussed. The Respondent may seek to
prove some positive point academically and in doing so, turn over their transcript. Relevant to
the question of affirmative consent? Clearly not. Covered under this requirement that all
evidence is provided? Likely so. Evidence might include the Respondent’s other disciplinary
record, their own mental health history or past sexual history, and other information that may be
in the record, but is not relevant to the underlying question of responsibility (and indeed may be
protected from disclosure by New York State law). In its effort to protect Respondents by
creating a regime where a Reporting Individual’s life is laid bare before the Respondent and their
advisor or attorney, regardless of relevance to the underlying matter, the Department is likewise
creating a regime that may dissuade Respondents from participating or being forthcoming,
knowing that any information they provide, even if irrelevant, even if more prejudicial than
probative, even if completely detached from any matter being considered in the conduct process,
will be provided to the Reporting Individual and their advisor or attorney.
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Section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) of the Proposed Regulations is not clear enough, and there are
too many situations in which it could compromise privacy for both Reporting Individuals and
Respondents alike. SUNY respectfully disagrees that this section, as written, complies with the
intentions in FERPA that the Department has pointed to as justification for this language, 326 and
requests the Department does not include this language.
vii. (Question 8) Appropriate time period for record retention
The Department proposes in section 106.45(b)(7) of the Proposed Regulations “that a
recipient must create, make available to the complainant and Respondent, and maintain records
for a period of three years.” 327 This time period is shorter than what is currently required by New
York State law, where section 6444(5)(b)(2) of the Education Law states that every student at an
institution shall have the right to have their records preserved for no less than five years. 328 New
York’s law goes beyond the record retention period that the Department has proposed, and as
such, SUNY would have to comply with New York State’s five year record retention period.
III.

Conclusion

SUNY and its campuses care deeply about preventing and responding to harassment and
assault in a way that makes education as accessible as possible, treats crimes and violations
seriously, and offers all due process required under the Constitution, statute, and case law prior
to assigning a sanction to a person found responsible for a violation. The University has had the
honor of supporting balanced approaches to violence reduction in the past. We sent a Negotiator
to the 2008 Negotiated Rulemaking to implement President Bush’s Higher Education
Opportunity Act (HEOA). We worked with our bi-partisan delegation and advised Negotiators
when the Department implemented President Obama’s Violence Against Women Act
amendments to the Clery Act. We have advised House and Senate members and staff of both
parties, inside and outside New York, on changes to the Higher Education Act, and other pieces
of legislation. In New York State, we proudly worked with Governor Cuomo and a bi-partisan
legislature that passed Education Law Article 129-B all but unanimously.
These laws were balanced. Balance gives legislation staying power. In New York, nearly
half of Education Law Article 129-B, the longest and most comprehensive state law on point to
date, is devoted to due process and fair process. That is a critical part of the approach.
Institutions must always try to “get it right” when it comes to sanctioning a student. But the law
is balanced. It also includes provisions on consent, amnesty for Reporting Individuals and
Bystanders disclosing violence at a time they were using drugs or alcohol, clear language around
confidentiality, mandatory biennial climate surveys to understand the state of the issue, and clear
language around available resources for all parties. Such a balanced approach has been lauded in
New York and looked to elsewhere.
A balanced approach helps a policy change stand the test of time. No one is calling for
drastic changes to the HEOA, to the VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act, or to the Negotiated
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Regulations issued by the Department under that law. Here in New York, no one is calling for
repeal of Education Law Article 129-B. These laws balance very important interests, and were
passed as a result of significant input from multiple parties, beyond just those who speak loudest.
It is likely that they will be on the books well beyond the retirement date of everyone who
worked on this letter.
The approach taken by the Department in these Proposed Regulations is not balanced. A
future administration of another party would quickly look to change the provisions, and
uncertainty about rights and responsibilities would continue. But that is not the only path
forward. We urge the Department to re-open consideration of these rules and issue new Proposed
Regulations that balance the rights of the accused with the rights of students exposed to
harassment and violence to access K-12 and higher education. This is a moment where the entire
country is considering issues of harassment in employment and education, athletics, the private
sector, and government. The Department has an opportunity to lead a national conversation
about a balanced approach to harassment and violence in education; to align with laws, both
federally and in states; and to establish an approach that future administrations leave undisturbed
because, even if not perfect, it is fair, balanced, and flexible to all different institutions to respond
in appropriate ways. We hope the Department takes advantage of this opportunity, and if the
leaders, faculty, staff, and students of the State University of New York can help the Department
achieve this lasting balance, please do not hesitate to call upon us.
Respectfully,

Kristina M. Johnson, PhD
Chancellor
The State University of New York
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